§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.

src/oauth-consent.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ export interface OAuthConsentDeps {
 
 // What to show on the consent screen for a third-party client.
 export interface ConsentView {
+  account?: string; // the signed-in user's email — shown so consent is informed (whose account)
   challenge: string;
   client: string; // display name
   scopes: string[];
@@ -47,7 +48,9 @@ function idTokenClaims(traits?: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown
 // the challenge, never client-submitted) plus id_token claims from the current Kratos session.
 async function accept(deps: OAuthConsentDeps, consent: ConsentRequest, cookie: string | undefined): Promise<string> {
   const session = await deps.kratos.whoami(cookie ? { cookie } : {});
-  const idToken = idTokenClaims(session?.identity?.traits);
+  // Only project id_token claims when the session's identity matches the subject Hydra bound at
+  // login — never leak a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (defensive).
+  const idToken = session?.identity?.id === consent.subject ? idTokenClaims(session?.identity?.traits) : undefined;
   const body: AcceptConsent = {
     grant_access_token_audience: consent.requested_access_token_audience ?? [],
     grant_scope: consent.requested_scope ?? [],
@@ -64,7 +67,11 @@ export async function resolveConsentChallenge(deps: OAuthConsentDeps, challenge:
   if (consent.skip || isFirstParty(consent.client)) {
     return { redirect: await accept(deps, consent, cookie) };
   }
-  return { view: { challenge, client: clientName(consent.client), scopes: consent.requested_scope ?? [] } };
+  // Third party: name the signed-in account on the screen so the user sees whose access they grant.
+  const session = await deps.kratos.whoami(cookie ? { cookie } : {});
+  const email = session?.identity?.traits?.email;
+  const account = typeof email === "string" ? email : undefined;
+  return { view: { challenge, client: clientName(consent.client), scopes: consent.requested_scope ?? [], ...(account ? { account } : {}) } };
 }
 
 // The user allowed: re-fetch the challenge (don't trust the form for scopes) and accept.