§9 optional revocation denylist (todo §9); closes the documented ~10m role/session lag for security-critical revoke, off by default (REVOCATION_DENYLIST, zero hot-path cost + zero behaviour change when off). New pure src/denylist.ts (createDenylist({ttlSec})): an in-memory, auto-evicting Map<sub, revokedAt> — revoke(sub) records now, isRevoked(sub, iat) rejects a subject's tokens minted at/before the revoke (iat <= revokedAt; missing iat fails closed), so a fresh re-login (iat after the revoke) passes while a downgrade lands immediately. Entries self-evict after REVOCATION_TTL_SEC (default 900 ≥ the 10m tokenizer TTL + skew), so it stays a bounded cache like JWKS — no database, Keto stays off the hot path. Wired: jwt-middleware.ts takes the denylist in VerifyOptions and throws TokenError(expired) on a revoked sub, so resolveSession routes it through the existing §4 re-mint (live session → fresh post-revoke JWT with current Keto roles; dead/deactivated → cleared cookie). app.ts merges it into authOptions (the same resolveSession hot-path call) and hands a bound revoke to the Users + Roles admin deps; admin-users.ts revokes on deactivate/delete, admin-roles.ts revokes a direct user: member on assign/unassign (a group:/whole-role change is transitive → left to lag, documented). server.ts builds it only when the toggle is on. Tests-first: denylist.test.ts (iat semantics, cutoff-advance, TTL eviction), jwt-middleware.test.ts (revoked→expired→re-mint, fresh passes), config.test.ts (toggle + posint TTL), app.test.ts (hot-path reject + fresh-login pass; admin deactivate/role-assign/unassign record the revoke). Stability-reviewer on the diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low). Per the §9 security-headers precedent, covered by unit + app-HTTP integration (no new browser E2E — no new user-facing page). README (Auth trade-off + new "Instant revoke" subsection, config table, Layout) updated. typecheck + 317 units green.

src/config.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ export interface Config {
   kratosPublicUrl: string;
   oryTimeoutSec: number; // per-call timeout for outbound Kratos/Keto/Hydra fetches (bounds a hung Ory)
   port: number;
+  revocationDenylist: boolean; // §9: enable the optional instant role/session revoke denylist
+  revocationTtlSec: number; // how long a revoke entry lives; keep ≥ tokenizer TTL + clock skew
   secureCookies: boolean;
 }
 
@@ -112,6 +114,11 @@ export function loadConfig(env: Env = process.env): Config {
     kratosPublicUrl: readUrl(env, "KRATOS_PUBLIC_URL", "http://kratos:4433"),
     oryTimeoutSec: readPosInt(env, "ORY_TIMEOUT_SEC", 5),
     port: readPort(env),
+    // Optional instant-revoke (§9), off by default. When on, an admin deactivate/delete or role
+    // change revokes the subject's live tokens at once; the entry lives ttl seconds (≥ the 10m
+    // tokenizer TTL + skew, so it outlasts any pre-revoke token).
+    revocationDenylist: readBool(env, "REVOCATION_DENYLIST", false),
+    revocationTtlSec: readPosInt(env, "REVOCATION_TTL_SEC", 900),
     // Set Secure on our session/CSRF cookies. Off by default (dev runs http); prod (https) sets it.
     secureCookies: readBool(env, "SECURE_COOKIES", false),
   };