Say user throughout, noting Ory's identity naming in the docs

src/auth/bootstrap.test.ts

@@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ test("identityPayload is a valid Kratos create-identity body with a password cre
   assert.equal(body.credentials.password.config.password, "admin");
 });
 
-test("permissionTuple grants a permission to identity:<id> in the Permission namespace", () => {
+test("permissionTuple grants a permission to user:<id> in the Permission namespace", () => {
   const id = randomUUID();
   assert.deepEqual(permissionTuple(id, "admin"), {
     namespace: "Permission",
     object: "admin",
     relation: "granted",
-    subject_id: `identity:${id}`,
+    subject_id: `user:${id}`,
   });
 });
 
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ test("seedAdmin on a fresh stack creates the identity and grants every permissio
   assert.equal(puts.length, 2); // one grant per permission
   assert.ok(puts.every((p) => p.method === "PUT"));
   assert.deepEqual(puts.map((p) => p.body), [
-    { namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: `identity:${id}` },
-    { namespace: "Permission", object: "scheduling:read", relation: "granted", subject_id: `identity:${id}` },
+    { namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${id}` },
+    { namespace: "Permission", object: "scheduling:read", relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${id}` },
   ]);
 });
 
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ test("seedAdmin is idempotent: a 409 reuses the existing identity and re-grants
   });
 
   assert.deepEqual(result, { created: false, id, permissions: ["admin"] });
-  assert.deepEqual(granted, { namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: `identity:${id}` });
+  assert.deepEqual(granted, { namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${id}` });
 });
 
 test("seedAdmin fails loud on an unexpected Kratos error", async () => {

src/auth/bootstrap.ts

@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ export function identityPayload(email: string, password: string) {
   };
 }
 
-// Coarse-permission grant: `Permission:<permission>#members@identity:<id>`. Subject ids are `identity:<kratos-id>`
+// Coarse-permission grant: `Permission:<permission>#members@user:<id>`. Subject ids are `user:<kratos-id>`
 // (namespaces.keto.ts) — the source of truth the login flow projects into the JWT permissions.
-export function permissionTuple(identityId: string, permission: string) {
-  return { namespace: "Permission", object: permission, relation: "granted", subject_id: `identity:${identityId}` };
+export function permissionTuple(userId: string, permission: string) {
+  return { namespace: "Permission", object: permission, relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${userId}` };
 }
 
 // The permissions to grant the demo admin = the configured base (ADMIN_PERMISSIONS, default just `admin`)

src/auth/guards.test.ts

@@ -2,17 +2,17 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http";
 import { Socket } from "node:net";
 import { test } from "node:test";
-import { buildContext, type RequestContext, type SessionIdentity } from "../http/context.ts";
+import { buildContext, type RequestContext, type User } from "../http/context.ts";
 import { can, check, GuardError, requireSession } from "./guards.ts";
 import type { KetoClient, RelationTuple } from "./keto-client.ts";
 
-function ctxFor(user: SessionIdentity | null, url = "/"): RequestContext {
+function ctxFor(user: User | null, url = "/"): RequestContext {
   const req = new IncomingMessage(new Socket());
   req.url = url;
-  return buildContext(req, new ServerResponse(req), { identity: user });
+  return buildContext(req, new ServerResponse(req), { user });
 }
 
-const alice: SessionIdentity = { email: "a@b.c", id: "u1", permissions: ["admin", "scheduling:read"] };
+const alice: User = { email: "a@b.c", id: "u1", permissions: ["admin", "scheduling:read"] };
 
 test("requireSession returns the user, or throws GuardError(401)→/login (preserving return_to) when anonymous", () => {
   assert.equal(requireSession(ctxFor(alice)), alice);
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ test("check asks Keto with the current user as subject; anonymous is denied with
   const tuple = { namespace: "Resource", object: "doc1", relation: "view" };
 
   assert.equal(await check(keto, ctxFor(alice), tuple), true);
-  assert.deepEqual(asked, { ...tuple, subject_id: "identity:u1" }); // subject is the signed-in user
+  assert.deepEqual(asked, { ...tuple, subject_id: "user:u1" }); // subject is the signed-in user
 
   asked = undefined;
   assert.equal(await check(keto, ctxFor(null), tuple), false); // fail-closed, no Keto call

src/auth/guards.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // the User on ctx; these read it. `requireSession` asserts (throws GuardError, which app.ts maps
 // to a response); `can`/`check` are predicates a handler branches on. `check` is the one live
 // Keto call — the fine-grained "may I?" tier (README), reserved for relationship rules.
-import type { RequestContext, SessionIdentity } from "../http/context.ts";
+import type { RequestContext, User } from "../http/context.ts";
 import type { KetoClient } from "./keto-client.ts";
 import { localPath } from "../http/safe-url.ts";
 
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ export class GuardError extends Error {
 }
 
 // Assert a signed-in session and return the user. Anonymous ⇒ GuardError → /login (return_to kept).
-export function requireSession(ctx: RequestContext): SessionIdentity {
-  if (!ctx.identity) throw new GuardError(401, "authentication required", loginRedirect(ctx));
-  return ctx.identity;
+export function requireSession(ctx: RequestContext): User {
+  if (!ctx.user) throw new GuardError(401, "authentication required", loginRedirect(ctx));
+  return ctx.user;
 }
 
 // Coarse permission check straight from the JWT claims — in-process, zero I/O. Anonymous ⇒ false.
@@ -49,6 +49,6 @@ export async function check(
   ctx: RequestContext,
   tuple: { namespace: string; object: string; relation: string },
 ): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (!ctx.identity) return false;
-  return keto.check({ ...tuple, subject_id: `identity:${ctx.identity.id}` });
+  if (!ctx.user) return false;
+  return keto.check({ ...tuple, subject_id: `user:${ctx.user.id}` });
 }

src/auth/jwt-middleware.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { generateKeyPairSync, sign, type JsonWebKey, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto";
 import { test } from "node:test";
 import { staticJwks } from "./jwks.ts";
-import { authenticate, claimsToIdentity, resolveSession, verifyToken } from "./jwt-middleware.ts";
+import { authenticate, claimsToUser, resolveSession, verifyToken } from "./jwt-middleware.ts";
 import { SESSION_COOKIE } from "./login.ts";
 
 const b64url = (input: Buffer | string): string => Buffer.from(input).toString("base64url");
@@ -59,31 +59,31 @@ test("verifyToken rejects a bad signature and an unknown kid", async () => {
   await assert.rejects(verifyToken(mint(k1.privateKey, "nope", valid), jwks, { now: NOW }), /no JWKS key/);
 });
 
-test("claimsToIdentity requires sub + email, defaults permissions to [], keeps only string permissions", () => {
-  assert.throws(() => claimsToIdentity({ email: "a@b.c", exp: NOW }), /sub/);
-  assert.throws(() => claimsToIdentity({ email: "a@b.c", exp: NOW, sub: "" }), /sub/); // empty sub rejected too
-  assert.throws(() => claimsToIdentity({ exp: NOW, sub: "u" }), /email/);
-  assert.throws(() => claimsToIdentity({ email: "", exp: NOW, sub: "u" }), /email/); // empty email rejected (the shell keys signed-in vs anonymous off it)
-  assert.deepEqual(claimsToIdentity({ email: "a@b.c", sub: "u" }).permissions, []); // permissions absent
-  assert.deepEqual(claimsToIdentity({ email: "a@b.c", permissions: ["a", 1, "b"], sub: "u" }).permissions, ["a", "b"]);
+test("claimsToUser requires sub + email, defaults permissions to [], keeps only string permissions", () => {
+  assert.throws(() => claimsToUser({ email: "a@b.c", exp: NOW }), /sub/);
+  assert.throws(() => claimsToUser({ email: "a@b.c", exp: NOW, sub: "" }), /sub/); // empty sub rejected too
+  assert.throws(() => claimsToUser({ exp: NOW, sub: "u" }), /email/);
+  assert.throws(() => claimsToUser({ email: "", exp: NOW, sub: "u" }), /email/); // empty email rejected (the shell keys signed-in vs anonymous off it)
+  assert.deepEqual(claimsToUser({ email: "a@b.c", sub: "u" }).permissions, []); // permissions absent
+  assert.deepEqual(claimsToUser({ email: "a@b.c", permissions: ["a", 1, "b"], sub: "u" }).permissions, ["a", "b"]);
 });
 
-test("resolveSession classifies the cookie; authenticate is its fail-closed identity projection", async () => {
+test("resolveSession classifies the cookie; authenticate is its fail-closed user projection", async () => {
   const cookie = (extra: Record<string, unknown> = {}, kid = "k1") => `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${mint(k1.privateKey, kid, { ...valid, ...extra })}`;
-  const identity = { email: "a@b.c", id: "u1", permissions: ["admin"] };
+  const user = { email: "a@b.c", id: "u1", permissions: ["admin"] };
 
   // A valid token → the user, not expired.
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie(), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, identity });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie(), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, user });
   // Present but past exp → the re-mint trigger (expired flagged, no user).
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie({ exp: NOW - 999 }), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: true, identity: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie({ exp: NOW - 999 }), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: true, user: null });
   // No cookie / non-ours / garbage / bad-signature are NOT re-mint candidates (no Ory round-trip).
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(undefined, jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, identity: null });
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession("other=1", jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, identity: null });
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=not.a.jwt`, jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, identity: null });
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie({}, "nope"), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, identity: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(undefined, jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, user: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession("other=1", jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, user: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=not.a.jwt`, jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, user: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(cookie({}, "nope"), jwks, { now: NOW }), { expired: false, user: null });
 
   // authenticate() is the convenience wrapper — resolveSession(...).user, dropping the flag.
-  assert.deepEqual(await authenticate(cookie(), jwks, { now: NOW }), identity);
+  assert.deepEqual(await authenticate(cookie(), jwks, { now: NOW }), user);
   assert.equal(await authenticate(cookie({ exp: NOW - 999 }), jwks, { now: NOW }), null); // expired ⇒ null
   assert.equal(await authenticate(undefined, jwks, { now: NOW }), null);
 });
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ test("verifyToken honours an optional denylist: a revoked subject's token reject
 
   // Revoked: thrown as *expired* so resolveSession flags it for the re-mint (re-read Keto / clear).
   await assert.rejects(verifyToken(mint(k1.privateKey, "k1", { ...valid, iat: NOW - 5 }), jwks, { denylist, now: NOW }), /revoked/);
-  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${mint(k1.privateKey, "k1", { ...valid, iat: NOW - 5 })}`, jwks, { denylist, now: NOW }), { expired: true, identity: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(await resolveSession(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${mint(k1.privateKey, "k1", { ...valid, iat: NOW - 5 })}`, jwks, { denylist, now: NOW }), { expired: true, user: null });
   // A token minted after the revoke (fresh login) is accepted; a different subject is untouched.
   assert.deepEqual(await verifyToken(mint(k1.privateKey, "k1", { ...valid, iat: NOW + 5 }), jwks, { denylist, now: NOW }), { email: "a@b.c", id: "u1", permissions: ["admin"] });
   await verifyToken(mint(k1.privateKey, "k1", { ...valid, iat: NOW - 5, sub: "u2" }), jwks, { denylist, now: NOW });

src/auth/jwt-middleware.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // check the signature (src/auth/jwt.ts), validate the time/issuer/audience claims, project the
 // User onto the request context. `authenticate` fails closed: any bad/expired token ⇒ null
 // (anonymous), so the route renders signed-out and the permission gate denies.
-import type { SessionIdentity } from "../http/context.ts";
+import type { User } from "../http/context.ts";
 import { parseCookies } from "../http/cookie.ts";
 import type { Denylist } from "./denylist.ts";
 import { decodeJws, verifyJws } from "./jwt.ts";
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ export function validateClaims(payload: Record<string, unknown>, options: Verify
 // Map verified claims → the request User. sub/email are required and non-empty (the tokenizer
 // always sets them; an empty email would read as anonymous in the shell); permissions defaults to [] and
 // keeps only string entries (defensive).
-export function claimsToIdentity(payload: Record<string, unknown>): SessionIdentity {
+export function claimsToUser(payload: Record<string, unknown>): User {
   const sub = payload["sub"];
   if (typeof sub !== "string" || sub === "") throw new TokenError("token missing sub");
   const email = payload["email"];
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ export function claimsToIdentity(payload: Record<string, unknown>): SessionIdent
 
 // Verify a session JWT end-to-end: select the key by `kid`, check the signature, validate
 // claims, project the User. Throws TokenError / the underlying verify error on any failure.
-export async function verifyToken(token: string, jwks: JwksProvider, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<SessionIdentity> {
+export async function verifyToken(token: string, jwks: JwksProvider, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<User> {
   const { header } = decodeJws(token); // unverified — only to read `kid` for key selection
   const jwk = await jwks.getKey(header.kid);
   if (!jwk) throw new TokenError(`no JWKS key for kid ${header.kid ?? "(none)"}`);
   const verified = verifyJws(token, jwk); // throws on a bad signature / disallowed alg
   validateClaims(verified.payload, options);
-  const user = claimsToIdentity(verified.payload);
+  const user = claimsToUser(verified.payload);
   // Instant revoke: a denylisted subject's pre-revoke token is rejected as *expired* so
   // resolveSession routes it through the re-mint (fresh permissions from Keto, or a cleared session).
   if (options.denylist?.isRevoked(user.id, num(verified.payload, "iat"))) throw new TokenError("token revoked", true);
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export async function verifyToken(token: string, jwks: JwksProvider, options: Ve
 
 export interface SessionAuth {
   expired: boolean; // a token was present but rejected as *expired* → a re-mint candidate
-  identity: SessionIdentity | null;
+  user: User | null;
 }
 
 // The request middleware: read our session cookie, verify it → the User (fail-closed: any
@@ -96,15 +96,15 @@ export interface SessionAuth {
 // expired session, never for anonymous or garbage requests.
 export async function resolveSession(cookieHeader: string | undefined, jwks: JwksProvider, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<SessionAuth> {
   const token = parseCookies(cookieHeader)[SESSION_COOKIE];
-  if (!token) return { expired: false, identity: null };
+  if (!token) return { expired: false, user: null };
   try {
-    return { expired: false, identity: await verifyToken(token, jwks, options) };
+    return { expired: false, user: await verifyToken(token, jwks, options) };
   } catch (err) {
-    return { expired: err instanceof TokenError && err.expired, identity: null };
+    return { expired: err instanceof TokenError && err.expired, user: null };
   }
 }
 
 // Convenience for callers that don't re-mint: just the User, or null.
-export async function authenticate(cookieHeader: string | undefined, jwks: JwksProvider, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<SessionIdentity | null> {
-  return (await resolveSession(cookieHeader, jwks, options)).identity;
+export async function authenticate(cookieHeader: string | undefined, jwks: JwksProvider, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<User | null> {
+  return (await resolveSession(cookieHeader, jwks, options)).user;
 }

src/auth/keto-client.test.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { createKetoClient, KetoError } from "./keto-client.ts";
 
 const READ = "http://keto:4466";
 const WRITE = "http://keto:4467";
-const USER = "identity:01902d5e-7b6c-7e3a-9f21-3c8d1e0a4b55";
+const USER = "user:01902d5e-7b6c-7e3a-9f21-3c8d1e0a4b55";
 
 function res(status: number, body?: unknown): Response {
   const h = new Headers();
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ test("check GETs the read API and returns the allowed boolean (true and false)",
   assert.match(allow.calls[0]!.url, new RegExp(`subject_id=${encodeURIComponent(USER).replace(/[.]/g, "\\.")}`));
   // A denied check is 403 {allowed:false} (not a 200) — both statuses carry the verdict.
   const deny = recorder(() => res(403, { allowed: false }));
-  assert.equal(await keto(deny.fetchImpl).check({ namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: "identity:nobody" }), false);
+  assert.equal(await keto(deny.fetchImpl).check({ namespace: "Permission", object: "admin", relation: "granted", subject_id: "user:nobody" }), false);
 });
 
 test("check on a subject_set builds subject_set.* params and forwards max-depth", async () => {

src/auth/kratos-admin.ts

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ export interface RecoveryCode {
 
 export interface KratosAdmin {
   createIdentity(payload: unknown): Promise<Identity>;
-  createRecoveryCode(identityId: string, opts?: { expiresIn?: string }): Promise<RecoveryCode>;
+  createRecoveryCode(userId: string, opts?: { expiresIn?: string }): Promise<RecoveryCode>;
   deleteIdentity(id: string): Promise<void>;
   getIdentity(id: string): Promise<Identity | null>;
   listIdentities(opts?: ListOptions): Promise<IdentityList>;
@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ export function createKratosAdmin(config: { baseUrl: string; fetchImpl?: typeof
 
     // Mint a recovery code for an identity (admin "trigger recovery") — the link is mailed to the
     // user by Kratos; the code/link are also returned so an operator can hand them over directly.
-    async createRecoveryCode(identityId, opts = {}) {
-      const body: Record<string, unknown> = { identity_id: identityId };
+    async createRecoveryCode(userId, opts = {}) {
+      const body: Record<string, unknown> = { identity_id: userId };
       if (opts.expiresIn) body.expires_in = opts.expiresIn;
       const res = await http(`${base}/admin/recovery/code`, { body: JSON.stringify(body), headers: json, method: "POST" });
       if (res.status !== 200 && res.status !== 201) return fail("create recovery code", res);

src/auth/login.test.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import type { KratosPublic, Session } from "./kratos-public.ts";
 import { completeLogin, readPermissions, remintSession, SESSION_COOKIE, sessionCookie } from "./login.ts";
 
 const ID = "01902d5e-7b6c-7e3a-9f21-3c8d1e0a4b55";
-const permissionTuple = (object: string): RelationTuple => ({ namespace: "Permission", object, relation: "granted", subject_id: `identity:${ID}` });
+const permissionTuple = (object: string): RelationTuple => ({ namespace: "Permission", object, relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${ID}` });
 
 const ketoStub = (over: Partial<KetoClient> = {}): KetoClient => ({
   check: async () => false,
@@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ test("readPermissions returns permissions held directly OR transitively (enumera
     // subjects vary (a direct user, a group) and a name repeats across pages → de-duped.
     listRelations: async (q) => {
       listQ.push(q);
-      if (q?.pageToken === "p2") return { nextPageToken: null, tuples: [permission("editor", { subject_id: "identity:other" })] };
+      if (q?.pageToken === "p2") return { nextPageToken: null, tuples: [permission("editor", { subject_id: "user:other" })] };
       return { nextPageToken: "p2", tuples: [
         permission("editor", { subject_set: { namespace: "Group", object: "eng", relation: "members" } }),
-        permission("admin", { subject_id: `identity:${ID}` }),
-        permission("viewer", { subject_id: "identity:stranger" }),
+        permission("admin", { subject_id: `user:${ID}` }),
+        permission("viewer", { subject_id: "user:stranger" }),
       ] };
     },
     // Keto resolves transitively: the user holds editor (via a group) + admin (direct), not viewer.
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ test("completeLogin: read permissions → project onto metadata_public → token
   const keto = ketoStub({ check: async () => true, listRelations: async () => ({ nextPageToken: null, tuples: [permissionTuple("admin")] }) });
 
   const out = await completeLogin({ keto, kratosAdmin, kratosPublic }, "plainpages_session=s");
-  assert.deepEqual(out, { email: "admin@plainpages.local", identityId: ID, jwt: "h.p.s", permissions: ["admin"] });
+  assert.deepEqual(out, { email: "admin@plainpages.local", userId: ID, jwt: "h.p.s", permissions: ["admin"] });
   assert.deepEqual(projected, { permissions: ["admin"] }); // Keto permissions, projected for the tokenizer
   assert.deepEqual(events, ["whoami", "project", "tokenize"]); // projection MUST precede tokenize
 });
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ test("remintSession: a live Kratos session → fresh cookie + refreshed user; a
 
   // TTL lapsed but the Kratos session lives → re-read permissions from Keto, re-tokenize, fresh cookie.
   const live = await remintSession({ keto, kratosAdmin: adminStub(), kratosPublic }, "plainpages_session=s");
-  assert.deepEqual(live.identity, { email: "admin@plainpages.local", id: ID, permissions: ["admin"] });
+  assert.deepEqual(live.user, { email: "admin@plainpages.local", id: ID, permissions: ["admin"] });
   assert.match(live.setCookie, /^plainpages_jwt=h\.p\.s;.*Max-Age=2592000.*HttpOnly/);
 
   // Kratos session also gone → clear the stale JWT so the next request falls through to anonymous.
   const dead = await remintSession({ keto, kratosAdmin: adminStub(), kratosPublic: publicStub() }, undefined);
-  assert.equal(dead.identity, null);
+  assert.equal(dead.user, null);
   assert.match(dead.setCookie, /^plainpages_jwt=;.*Max-Age=0/);
 });
 

src/auth/login.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 //   4. whoami(tokenize_as)       → the signed JWT { sub, email, permissions }, stored as our cookie
 // Order matters: the projection is written before tokenizing, because the claims mapper
 // reads only the identity, never Keto.
-import type { SessionIdentity } from "../http/context.ts";
+import type { User } from "../http/context.ts";
 import { serializeCookie, type CookieOptions } from "../http/cookie.ts";
 import { currentLog } from "../logger.ts";
 import type { KetoClient } from "./keto-client.ts";
@@ -32,18 +32,18 @@ export interface LoginDeps {
 
 export interface CompletedLogin {
   email: string | null;
-  identityId: string;
+  userId: string;
   jwt: string;
   permissions: string[];
 }
 
-// The coarse permissions a user holds — directly (`Permission:<name>#members@identity:<id>`) or transitively via a
+// The coarse permissions a user holds — directly (`Permission:<name>#members@user:<id>`) or transitively via a
 // group that is a member of the permission. Enumerates the defined permissions (the distinct objects in the Permission
 // namespace) and asks Keto to resolve each membership, so a permission granted to a group reaches the JWT —
 // matching the OPL model and the admin "Effective access" view. At login/refresh only, never per
 // request; permission count is small, so the per-permission checks are cheap and run in parallel.
-export async function readPermissions(keto: KetoClient, identityId: string): Promise<string[]> {
-  const subject_id = `identity:${identityId}`;
+export async function readPermissions(keto: KetoClient, userId: string): Promise<string[]> {
+  const subject_id = `user:${userId}`;
   const names = new Set<string>();
   let pageToken: string | undefined;
   do {
@@ -59,24 +59,24 @@ export async function readPermissions(keto: KetoClient, identityId: string): Pro
 export async function completeLogin(deps: LoginDeps, cookie: string | undefined): Promise<CompletedLogin | null> {
   const session = await deps.kratosPublic.whoami(cookie ? { cookie } : {});
   if (!session?.identity) return null;
-  const identityId = session.identity.id;
+  const userId = session.identity.id;
   const emailTrait = session.identity.traits?.["email"];
   const email = typeof emailTrait === "string" ? emailTrait : null;
 
-  const permissions = await readPermissions(deps.keto, identityId);
-  await deps.kratosAdmin.updateMetadataPublic(identityId, { permissions });
+  const permissions = await readPermissions(deps.keto, userId);
+  await deps.kratosAdmin.updateMetadataPublic(userId, { permissions });
 
   const tokenized = await deps.kratosPublic.whoami({ ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}), tokenizeAs: TOKENIZE_AS });
   const jwt = tokenized?.tokenized;
   if (!jwt) throw new Error("login completion: Kratos tokenizer returned no JWT");
 
-  currentLog()?.info("session minted", { permissions: permissions.join(","), sub: identityId }); // login or TTL re-mint
-  return { email, identityId, jwt, permissions };
+  currentLog()?.info("session minted", { permissions: permissions.join(","), sub: userId }); // login or TTL re-mint
+  return { email, userId, jwt, permissions };
 }
 
 export interface Reminted {
   setCookie: string; // a fresh JWT cookie on success, else a cookie that clears the stale one
-  identity: SessionIdentity | null;
+  user: User | null;
 }
 
 // Re-mint the session JWT on TTL expiry — "stay signed in" (README): the ~10m token lapsed but
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ export interface Reminted {
 // anonymous instead of re-hitting Ory on every one.
 export async function remintSession(deps: LoginDeps, cookie: string | undefined, options: { secure?: boolean } = {}): Promise<Reminted> {
   const completed = await completeLogin(deps, cookie);
-  if (!completed) return { setCookie: clearSessionCookie(options), identity: null };
-  return { setCookie: sessionCookie(completed.jwt, options), identity: { email: completed.email ?? "", id: completed.identityId, permissions: completed.permissions } };
+  if (!completed) return { setCookie: clearSessionCookie(options), user: null };
+  return { setCookie: sessionCookie(completed.jwt, options), user: { email: completed.email ?? "", id: completed.userId, permissions: completed.permissions } };
 }
 
 // Build the Set-Cookie for our session JWT. HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax by default; `secure` is

src/auth/routes.ts

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ function flowPage(kratos: KratosPublic, flowType: FlowType, secureCookies: boole
     const pathname = ctx.url.pathname;
     // Already signed in? Re-authenticating / re-registering is pointless — send them to the app
     // dashboard. (/settings, /recovery, /verification stay reachable — a signed-in user can use those.)
-    if (ctx.identity && (flowType === "login" || flowType === "registration")) return { redirect: "/dashboard" };
+    if (ctx.user && (flowType === "login" || flowType === "registration")) return { redirect: "/dashboard" };
     const cookie = ctx.req.headers.cookie;
     const flowId = ctx.url.searchParams.get("flow");
     // Only the Kratos calls are in the try, so a render/buildFlowView bug below falls through to
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ function flowPage(kratos: KratosPublic, flowType: FlowType, secureCookies: boole
       // Expired/unknown flow → restart by re-initialising (drop the stale ?flow=).
       if (err instanceof KratosError && [403, 404, 410].includes(err.status)) return { redirect: pathname };
       // Already authenticated at Kratos but no app JWT yet (e.g. straight after registration, whose
-      // `session` hook signs the user in but routes to verification, not /auth/complete — so ctx.identity
+      // `session` hook signs the user in but routes to verification, not /auth/complete — so ctx.user
       // is null and the "already signed in" short-circuit above can't fire). Initialising a login/
       // registration flow then returns Kratos 400 `session_already_available`. Recover by completing
       // login (mint the JWT from the live session), honouring return_to — never a 500.
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ function logout(kratos: KratosPublic, secureCookies: boolean): BuiltinRoute["han
     }
     const flow = await kratos.createLogoutFlow(ctx.req.headers.cookie ? { cookie: ctx.req.headers.cookie } : {});
     ctx.res.appendHeader("set-cookie", clearSessionCookie({ secure: secureCookies }));
-    ctx.log.info("logout", { sub: ctx.identity?.id ?? "" });
+    ctx.log.info("logout", { sub: ctx.user?.id ?? "" });
     return { redirect: flow?.logoutUrl ?? "/login" };
   };
 }