Plan 0.5.0 from the ten highest-scoring items; reserve the plugin id error, translate the duplicate-group refusal, and correct four comments and README passages

src/auth/bootstrap.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export function identityPayload(email: string, password: string) {
   };
 }
 
-// Coarse-permission grant: `Permission:<permission>#members@user:<id>`. Subject ids are `user:<kratos-id>`
+// Coarse-permission grant: `Permission:<permission>#granted@user:<id>`. Subject ids are `user:<kratos-id>`
 // (namespaces.keto.ts) — the source of truth the login flow projects into the JWT permissions.
 export function permissionTuple(userId: string, permission: string) {
   return { namespace: "Permission", object: permission, relation: "granted", subject_id: `user:${userId}` };

src/auth/login.ts

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ export interface CompletedLogin {
   permissions: string[];
 }
 
-// The coarse permissions a user holds — directly (`Permission:<name>#members@user:<id>`) or transitively via a
-// group that is a member of the permission. Enumerates the defined permissions (the distinct objects in the Permission
+// The coarse permissions a user holds — directly (`Permission:<name>#granted@user:<id>`) or transitively via a
+// group granted the permission. Enumerates the defined permissions (the distinct objects in the Permission
 // namespace) and asks Keto to resolve each membership, so a permission granted to a group reaches the JWT —
 // matching the OPL model and the admin "Effective access" view. At login/refresh only, never per
 // request; permission count is small, so the per-permission checks are cheap and run in parallel.

src/auth/routes.ts

@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ function flowPage(kratos: KratosPublic, flowType: FlowType, secureCookies: boole
 // A code flow's POST (flow-view.ts → CODE_FLOWS). Trims the pasted one-time code, since Kratos
 // refuses one with whitespace around it, then passes the form on to Kratos and sends the browser
 // where Kratos redirects. Kratos' csrf_token field guards the POST, so the host's own CSRF token
-// isn't checked here.
+// isn't checked here. `submitFlow` throws only on a 5xx or an unreachable Kratos, so of
+// `flowFailure`'s branches only the 503 fires here.
 function codeFlowSubmit(kratos: KratosPublic, flowType: FlowType, secureCookies: boolean): BuiltinRoute["handler"] {
   return async (ctx: RequestContext): Promise<RouteResult> => {
     const pathname = ctx.url.pathname;