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521c09fa2d
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§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.
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2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00 |
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1c324b18e3
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Built-in OAuth2 client-registration admin screen (todo §6); /admin/clients lists/registers/deletes the Hydra OAuth2 clients other apps log in through us with. New src/admin-clients.ts (pure builders + handleAdminClients, mirroring the §5 Users/Roles screens): list (search/paginate over one fetched Hydra page), register (GET form + POST), read-only detail, delete-confirm. src/hydra-admin.ts gains the client half of the admin API — createClient/listClients/getClient/deleteClient over /admin/clients (+ a nextPageToken Link parser like kratos-admin) and the registration fields on OAuth2Client. Register builds a standard authorization-code client (+ refresh_token), confidential (client_secret_basic) or public (PKCE/none), with an optional first-party auto-consent flag; Hydra returns the client_secret once, so the register POST renders the new client's detail page with the one-time secret directly (no PRG) and it is never re-shown (getClient carries no secret; the detail test asserts it). Writes go only to Hydra; gated admin-only (anon->/login, non-admin->403) + every mutation CSRF-guarded via requireAdmin/guardedForm like §5; a Hydra 4xx (bad redirect/scope) re-renders the form (400), a 5xx -> 500 (mirrors oauth-login.ts); :id via safeDecode (malformed->404). Wired into app.ts (/admin/clients, gated on the hydra client present) and the shared adminSection (Users.Groups.Roles.OAuth2 clients, i-globe) so it shows for admins and is invisible otherwise. New views (admin/clients, client-form, client-detail + partials/client-{form,detail}-body) reuse the shell/filter-bar/data-table/field blocks; one .detail-list CSS rule; README Layout/§6 updated. Tests-first: hydra-admin.test.ts (client CRUD contracts incl. Link pagination/404->null/204), admin-clients.test.ts (builder/validation/payload matrix), app.test.ts HTTP integration (gate/list/register-shows-secret-once/invalid+CSRF-reject/detail-hides-secret/delete + malformed-%->404). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one nit (dropped a dead URL.protocol check in validateClientInput). Boot-verified the client CRUD live against real Hydra v26.2.0 (create->201 w/ one-time secret -> list finds it -> get -> delete -> get null); torn down. typecheck + 274 units green.
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2026-06-19 11:23:27 +02:00 |
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a016a0131e
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Built-in Roles & permissions admin screen (todo §5); /admin/roles list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + assign-to-users/groups + "effective access" (Keto expand → transitive members), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users/Groups (Kratos read only to label members). A role = Keto subject set Role:<name>#members; reuses the Groups membership helpers (now-exported pagedTuples/memberCandidates/safeDecode); added a Roles nav entry (i-shield) + a .plain-list CSS rule. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its explicit-expand-depth nit. Live boot-verify caught a real bug the tests missed — Keto v26.2.0 nests the expand subject under tuple (not node top-level as the §4 ExpandTree type guessed), so expandToEffectiveUsers returned []; fixed type+walker+fixtures, re-verified a group-only member surfaces in effective access. 237→243 units + typecheck green; expand chain boot-verified live then torn down.
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2026-06-18 18:18:18 +02:00 |
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32e5e2f7eb
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Built-in Groups admin screen (todo §5); /admin/groups list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + membership (add/remove users & nested groups), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users (Kratos read only to label pickers). A group = Keto subject set Group:<name>#members, exists while it has ≥1 member: create writes the first-member tuple, delete removes all by partial-filter. Extracted shared admin-nav.ts (Dashboard·Users·Groups); new generic rowHeader <th scope=row> data-table cell. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: symmetric subject UUID-validation, duplicate-name rejection, malformed-%→404. 228→237 units + typecheck green; core Keto interactions boot-verified live
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2026-06-18 17:40:36 +02:00 |
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79cfa2ee7f
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Built-in Users admin screen (todo §5); /admin/users list (filter/sort/paginate) + create/edit/deactivate/delete + trigger-recovery, writing only to Kratos via the admin client — gated admin-only (anon→/login, non-admin→403) and CSRF-guarded like logout. New kratosAdmin.createRecoveryCode; reserved the "admin" plugin id; views:[viewsDir] so subfolder views reuse partials/. Reviewer §5 opener: extracted shell-context.ts (buildShellContext/shellUser) shared by dashboard+admin, threading the real signed-in user (drops the hardcoded demo profile). 217→228 units + 8 visual E2E green; boot-verified full CRUD+recovery live on the Ory stack
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2026-06-18 12:26:19 +02:00 |
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4b2173cb84
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Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form
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2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00 |
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26a7821611
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Render SSO buttons per configured Kratos OIDC provider (todo §4); flow-view collects oidc nodes → auth-card submit buttons, server-side visibility, drop mockup #sso-toggle CSS
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2026-06-17 18:20:45 +02:00 |
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0928f9dd39
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Render Kratos self-service flows as themed pages (todo §4); buildFlowView + views/auth.ejs + login/registration/recovery/verification/settings routes
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2026-06-17 17:55:56 +02:00 |
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ff7b55be4c
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Wire branding into the app shell (todo §2); render config logo + default theme, fall back to the brand mark
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2026-06-16 16:07:24 +02:00 |
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645a316419
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Make markup semantic + add semantic DOM principle (todo §1); page <h1>, skip link, row-header <th scope=row>, descriptive error pages
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2026-06-15 16:53:07 +02:00 |
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bddc1f891d
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Add menu/popover + theme-switch partials (todo §1); data-driven .menu (items/check-groups/positioning), Light/Auto/Dark switch, shell reuses both
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2026-06-15 13:27:44 +02:00 |
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7716e38d84
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Add field + auth-card partials (todo §1); data-driven .field (label/icon/hint/server error) and auth-card shell (head/SSO/body/alt)
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2026-06-15 13:16:36 +02:00 |
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30db8216e6
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Move foundation CSS into public/css (todo §1); drop placeholder style.css, repoint views + mockups
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2026-06-15 11:25:43 +02:00 |
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4eed701419
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Scaffold Docker-only Node 24 + TypeScript EJS web backend
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2026-06-14 11:45:30 +02:00 |
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