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521c09fa2d
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§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.
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2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00 |
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0900bf49bd
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Built-in OAuth2 consent-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/consent grants scopes to a client logging in through us. New src/oauth-consent.ts (pure, sibling of oauth-login.ts): resolveConsentChallenge auto-accepts a first-party client (Hydra metadata.first_party===true) or a Hydra-skipped one, else returns a view to show the themed consent screen; acceptConsent re-reads the challenge so scopes/audience are never client-supplied; rejectConsent → access_denied. The grant carries an OIDC session.id_token with email/name projected from the Kratos identity (whoami traits, omitted when absent). src/hydra-admin.ts gains the consent half (get/accept/reject consent + types; login/consent URL builder folded into one reqUrl(kind,…) + shared put()). Wired in app.ts at GET|POST /oauth2/consent (gated on hydra+kratos): GET shows/auto-accepts (sets the CSRF cookie when fresh), POST is CSRF-guarded (same signed double-submit as /logout) and dispatches allow→accept / else→reject → 303 to Hydra; a stale/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx) degrades to a recoverable 400, a real outage (5xx) → 500 (mirrors /oauth2/login). views/oauth-consent.ejs + partials/consent-body.ejs reuse the auth-card, listing the requested scopes (friendly labels for the standard OIDC ones) with Allow/Deny submit buttons. Tests-first: hydra-admin consent contracts + oauth-consent skip/first-party/third-party/audience/id_token/refetch/reject matrix + app HTTP integration (auto-accept / screen+CSRF cookie / allow+deny / forged-CSRF→403 / missing→400 / stale→400 / outage→500). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High. Extended e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts to drive the whole authorization-code flow against real Hydra — login accept → follow login_verifier through Hydra → web's consent screen (third-party e2e-login, scopes listed) → Allow → consent_verifier → client callback with a real code (per-host cookie jars, Hydra resume URLs rebased onto the compose host). typecheck + 262 units + 8 visual + OAuth login+consent E2E green. OAuth2 client registration is the next §6 item.
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2026-06-19 10:53:21 +02:00 |
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3c8090e8e3
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Built-in OAuth2 login-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/login resolves a Hydra login challenge via the Kratos session — skip→accept(subject), live session→accept(identity id), no session→bounce to /login?return_to back here so Kratos lands on the challenge once signed in. New src/hydra-admin.ts (fetch client: get/accept/reject login request + HydraError, mirrors the kratos/keto clients) + src/oauth-login.ts (pure resolveLoginChallenge); wired in app.ts (the absolute return URL derives from the request Host + the SECURE_COOKIES scheme — a spoofed Host can't escape, Kratos validates return_to against its allow-list; /login now bakes return_to into the flow init), config.hydraAdminUrl (default http://hydra:4445), server builds the client, compose web now gates on hydra healthy (the app consumes it). A stale/invalid/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx — back button, slow login) degrades to a recoverable 400, not a 500; a genuine Hydra 5xx outage still surfaces as 500. Tests-first: hydra-admin/oauth-login units + app/config/compose HTTP integration + full-stack e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts (compose.e2e-oauth.yml — registers an OAuth2 client, starts an auth flow, asserts the unauthenticated bounce and the authenticated accept; boot-verified then torn down). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one warning (4xx→400 degrade). Deferred §9: document that prod allowed_return_urls entries must be exact origins with a trailing /. typecheck + 253 units + 8 visual + oauth-login E2E green. Consent handler + client registration are the next §6 items.
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2026-06-18 21:45:24 +02:00 |
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