8 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
lilleman	f189f88942	§7 reference plugin (todo §7); plugins/scheduling is the worked example of the plugin contract — a list page fetching upstream data, a CSRF-guarded form forwarding writes upstream, permission-gated nav. shifts.ts: an injectable-fetch upstream REST client (stateless stand-in for the customer backend) + thin handler factories (list filters by ?q + degrades to a recoverable page on upstream-down; create CSRF-guards via ctx.verifyCsrf, validates, forwards, PRG, 502 on upstream 4xx). plugin.ts: apiVersion literal, namespaced scheduling:read/write perms, nav gated so the whole Scheduling header vanishes for non-holders. Views compose the core building blocks around the native app shell, incl. the plugin's own partials/shift-form. New host capability so a plugin page is native + secure (src/chrome.ts buildPluginChrome): ctx.chrome = brand/global-nav/user/theme/csrf for partials/shell (global menu = Dashboard + every plugin nav fragment + gated admin section, role-filtered + current-marked); ctx.verifyCsrf = the host's bound double-submit verifier (secret stays in the host). Both added to RequestContext (defaulted in buildContext), built per plugin route in app.ts (CSRF cookie set when fresh). Dashboard merges plugin nav fragments too (gated => invisible to anonymous, visual E2E byte-identical). Out of the box: bootstrap grants the demo admin scheduling:read/write (seedAdmin generalized to a roles list, env ADMIN_ROLES); dev compose runs a tiny stdlib mock upstream (examples/shifts-upstream, SCHEDULING_UPSTREAM). plugins/ added to tsconfig + the npm test glob. Tests-first across shifts/chrome/app/dashboard/bootstrap. README Building-a-plugin + Layout and docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.chrome/verifyCsrf, upstream pattern) updated. typecheck + 296 units + the Ory-free visual E2E green (plugin discovered at boot, routes/nav gated, dashboard unchanged); live full-stack boot-verified (stack up with plugin + mock upstream serving the seeded shifts, bootstrap grants in real Keto all allowed:true) then torn down. apiVersion stays 1.0.0 (contract still assembled in §7). Authenticated browser happy-path deferred to §8 full E2E (line 114).	2026-06-19 14:48:27 +02:00
lilleman	521c09fa2d	§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.	2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00
lilleman	0900bf49bd	Built-in OAuth2 consent-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/consent grants scopes to a client logging in through us. New src/oauth-consent.ts (pure, sibling of oauth-login.ts): resolveConsentChallenge auto-accepts a first-party client (Hydra metadata.first_party===true) or a Hydra-skipped one, else returns a view to show the themed consent screen; acceptConsent re-reads the challenge so scopes/audience are never client-supplied; rejectConsent → access_denied. The grant carries an OIDC session.id_token with email/name projected from the Kratos identity (whoami traits, omitted when absent). src/hydra-admin.ts gains the consent half (get/accept/reject consent + types; login/consent URL builder folded into one reqUrl(kind,…) + shared put()). Wired in app.ts at GET|POST /oauth2/consent (gated on hydra+kratos): GET shows/auto-accepts (sets the CSRF cookie when fresh), POST is CSRF-guarded (same signed double-submit as /logout) and dispatches allow→accept / else→reject → 303 to Hydra; a stale/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx) degrades to a recoverable 400, a real outage (5xx) → 500 (mirrors /oauth2/login). views/oauth-consent.ejs + partials/consent-body.ejs reuse the auth-card, listing the requested scopes (friendly labels for the standard OIDC ones) with Allow/Deny submit buttons. Tests-first: hydra-admin consent contracts + oauth-consent skip/first-party/third-party/audience/id_token/refetch/reject matrix + app HTTP integration (auto-accept / screen+CSRF cookie / allow+deny / forged-CSRF→403 / missing→400 / stale→400 / outage→500). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High. Extended e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts to drive the whole authorization-code flow against real Hydra — login accept → follow login_verifier through Hydra → web's consent screen (third-party e2e-login, scopes listed) → Allow → consent_verifier → client callback with a real code (per-host cookie jars, Hydra resume URLs rebased onto the compose host). typecheck + 262 units + 8 visual + OAuth login+consent E2E green. OAuth2 client registration is the next §6 item.	2026-06-19 10:53:21 +02:00
lilleman	3c8090e8e3	Built-in OAuth2 login-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/login resolves a Hydra login challenge via the Kratos session — skip→accept(subject), live session→accept(identity id), no session→bounce to /login?return_to back here so Kratos lands on the challenge once signed in. New src/hydra-admin.ts (fetch client: get/accept/reject login request + HydraError, mirrors the kratos/keto clients) + src/oauth-login.ts (pure resolveLoginChallenge); wired in app.ts (the absolute return URL derives from the request Host + the SECURE_COOKIES scheme — a spoofed Host can't escape, Kratos validates return_to against its allow-list; /login now bakes return_to into the flow init), config.hydraAdminUrl (default http://hydra:4445), server builds the client, compose web now gates on hydra healthy (the app consumes it). A stale/invalid/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx — back button, slow login) degrades to a recoverable 400, not a 500; a genuine Hydra 5xx outage still surfaces as 500. Tests-first: hydra-admin/oauth-login units + app/config/compose HTTP integration + full-stack e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts (compose.e2e-oauth.yml — registers an OAuth2 client, starts an auth flow, asserts the unauthenticated bounce and the authenticated accept; boot-verified then torn down). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one warning (4xx→400 degrade). Deferred §9: document that prod allowed_return_urls entries must be exact origins with a trailing /. typecheck + 253 units + 8 visual + oauth-login E2E green. Consent handler + client registration are the next §6 items.	2026-06-18 21:45:24 +02:00
lilleman	b5af4ba6cd	E2E for token timeout + refresh (todo §4); full-stack auth-refresh.spec.ts (real Ory stack): a lapsed session JWT is silently re-minted from the live Kratos session (roles re-read from Keto), and cleared once the session is revoked; ory/kratos/e2e.yml shortens the tokenizer ttl to 8s + adds JWT_CLOCK_SKEW_SEC config so re-mint fires at expiry; scope visual suite to visual.spec.ts	2026-06-18 11:32:23 +02:00
lilleman	4b2173cb84	Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form	2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00
lilleman	f91e08c2a6	Add Full, parallel E2E principle (todo §1.1); AGENTS §6 + README, 404 E2E coverage, --build the runner so spec edits apply	2026-06-15 16:58:26 +02:00
lilleman	6f590148af	Add dockerized Playwright E2E (todo §1); screenshot live pages + foundation mockups, assert shared design-system styles match	2026-06-15 16:37:21 +02:00