examples/plugins/scheduling/README.md

@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ Your backend must expose two routes; the plugin treats any non-2xx as a recovera
 | `GET /shifts` | `Accept: application/json`, optional `?assigneeId=<id>` | `200` | JSON array of `{ id, title, assignee, assigneeId, start, end }` (all strings; missing fields coerce to `""`). With `assigneeId`, only that person's rows |
 | `POST /shifts` | JSON body `{ title, assignee, start, end }` | `2xx` | ignored (the plugin POST-redirect-GETs back to the list) |
 
+`POST /shifts` carries the assignee as a **display name only**, so a shift created through this
+plugin's form belongs to nobody and surfaces on no one's "My shifts" — don't go hunting for it
+there. Resolving a name to an identity id needs a directory this demo has none of; a real backend
+does that join at create time and stores the `assigneeId` alongside the name.
+
 Domain rules (overlap, capacity, time ordering) live in your backend — reject with a 4xx and the
 form re-renders. The plugin only validates that `title` and `assignee` are non-empty.
 

examples/plugins/scheduling/i18n/en-US.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const messages = {
   "scheduling.new.title": "New shift",
   "scheduling.overview.lead":
     "Scheduling coordinates shifts across your team. Anyone can read this overview; the shift list itself is available to people with the <code>scheduling:read</code> permission.",
+  "scheduling.overview.mine": "See my shifts",
   "scheduling.overview.signIn": "Sign in to view shifts",
   "scheduling.overview.title": "Scheduling",
   "scheduling.overview.view": "View shifts",

examples/plugins/scheduling/i18n/sv-SE.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const messages: SchedulingMessages = {
   "scheduling.new.title": "Nytt pass",
   "scheduling.overview.lead":
     "Schemaläggningen samordnar teamets pass. Alla kan läsa den här översikten; själva passlistan kräver behörigheten <code>scheduling:read</code>.",
+  "scheduling.overview.mine": "Visa mina pass",
   "scheduling.overview.signIn": "Logga in för att se passen",
   "scheduling.overview.title": "Schemaläggning",
   "scheduling.overview.view": "Visa pass",

examples/plugins/scheduling/shifts.test.ts

@@ -115,14 +115,21 @@ test("listShifts degrades to a recoverable error page when the upstream is down
 
 // ---- public overview handler (a page anyone can reach, gated data stays behind the permission) ----
 
-test("overview renders a public page for anyone; it links straight to Shifts only for a reader", async () => {
+test("overview renders a public page for anyone, and its CTA names the best gate the visitor passes", async () => {
   const anon = asView(await overview()(fakeCtx())); // user null, no permissions
   assert.equal(anon.view, "overview");
   assert.equal(anon.data["chrome"], CHROME);
   assert.equal(anon.data["canRead"], false); // anonymous → prompt to sign in, no shifts link
+  assert.equal(anon.data["signedIn"], false);
 
   const reader = asView(await overview()(fakeCtx({ permissions: ["scheduling:read"] })));
   assert.equal(reader.data["canRead"], true); // a reader gets a link straight to the shifts list
+
+  // Signed in but ungranted: the page must not invite them to sign in again.
+  const member = asView(await overview()(fakeCtx({ user: { email: "m@example.test", id: "01a06091-baa3-7a1f-9c62-0e3ab6d2f5c1", permissions: [] } })));
+  assert.equal(member.data["canRead"], false);
+  assert.equal(member.data["signedIn"], true);
+  assert.equal(member.data["mineHref"], "/scheduling/mine");
 });
 
 // ---- create handler ----

examples/plugins/scheduling/shifts.ts

@@ -236,7 +236,9 @@ export function overview(): RouteHandler {
       breadcrumbs: [{ label: ctx.t("scheduling.nav.overview") }],
       canRead: can(ctx, READ),
       chrome: ctx.chrome,
+      mineHref: ctx.localeHref(MINE_PATH),
       shiftsHref: ctx.localeHref(SHIFTS_PATH), // a plugin carries the visitor's locale onto its own links
+      signedIn: ctx.user !== null,
       signInHref: ctx.localeHref(`/login?return_to=${encodeURIComponent(ctx.localeHref(SHIFTS_PATH))}`),
       title: ctx.t("scheduling.overview.title"),
     },

examples/plugins/scheduling/views/overview.ejs

@@ -3,12 +3,16 @@
   nav node are marked `public`, so an anonymous visitor is let through and the menu option shows for
   everyone. The actual shifts data stays behind `scheduling:read`: a reader gets a link straight to
   it, anyone else a prompt to sign in. Rendered in the native shell via ctx.chrome.
-  Data: chrome, title, breadcrumbs, canRead, shiftsHref, signInHref
+  Data: chrome, title, breadcrumbs, canRead, mineHref, shiftsHref, signedIn, signInHref
 %><%
   const navHtml = include("partials/nav-tree", { nodes: chrome.nav });
+  // One CTA per gate the visitor passes: the list needs the permission, "My shifts" only a session,
+  // and sign-in is offered to nobody who already has one.
   const cta = canRead
     ? '<a class="btn btn-primary" href="' + shiftsHref + '">' + t("scheduling.overview.view") + '</a>'
-    : '<a class="btn btn-primary" href="' + signInHref + '">' + t("scheduling.overview.signIn") + '</a>';
+    : signedIn
+      ? '<a class="btn btn-primary" href="' + mineHref + '">' + t("scheduling.overview.mine") + '</a>'
+      : '<a class="btn btn-primary" href="' + signInHref + '">' + t("scheduling.overview.signIn") + '</a>';
 -%>
 <%- include("partials/shell", {
   actions: "",

todo.md

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 - [ ] Decide what `ICON_NAMES` (`src/ui/icons.ts`) actually is. `i-chart`, `i-copy`, `i-download` and `i-sliders` have no caller anywhere — so either they go, or the comment should say the palette is curated and may carry an id ahead of its first use. Not cosmetic: the sprite is inlined into every page, and the rule decides whether a future removal is routine cleanup or a plugin-facing regression.
 - [ ] Decide (once) whether the CSRF token staying unbound to `sub`/session is accepted. `src/auth/csrf.ts` signs `<nonce>.<HMAC(secret, nonce)>` with no session binding, so any validly-signed token passes for any user — an attacker who can write cookies on the origin can fix a token they know. Standard for unbound signed double-submit and plausibly fine behind `SameSite=Lax` + HSTS. Accepted ⇒ record it in AGENTS.md and README → Security model; not accepted ⇒ bind the nonce to `sub`.
 - [ ] Verify the documented Docker commands on macOS and fix whatever misbehaves — **macOS is a supported dev host**, but nothing here has been run on one. Two suspects, both from the `--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)"` idiom: a macOS `id -g` is `20`, which is `dialout` inside the noble image rather than a user group, and Docker Desktop remaps bind-mount ownership in its own VM layer. The same question covers rootless Docker, where README already says to *drop* the flag.
+- [ ] Map Kratos' 401 on a self-service flow init, so an anonymous `GET /settings` with no `?flow` renders instead of 500ing. `flowPage` (`src/auth/routes.ts`) maps 403/404/410 → restart the flow, 400 `session_already_available` → `/auth/complete`, and ≥500 → the themed 503, then rethrows everything else — and Kratos answers the settings-flow init with 401 when there is no session. `/settings` is correctly `public` (the recovery flow lands there with a live Kratos session but no app JWT), so the gate is not the fix: a 401 should redirect to `/login` with the page as `return_to`. No E2E covers an anonymous hit on a flow page that needs a session.
 
 ### Architectural review findings (2026-07-02)