Keep a secret setting's raw value out of the boot error that rejects it #201
@@ -109,31 +109,26 @@ test("each type coerces from the environment, and a bad value fails loud", () =>
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PLUGIN_SETTING_P_MODE: "loose",
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});
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assert.equal(bad.errors.length, 4);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_COUNT.*number/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_FLAG.*"true".*"false"/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_MODE.*strict, lenient/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_BASE.*URL/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_COUNT.*number, got "twelve"/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_FLAG.*"true".*"false", got "yes"/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_MODE.*strict, lenient, got "loose"/);
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assert.match(bad.errors.join("\n"), /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_BASE.*URL, got "not a url"/);
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});
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test("a secret's bad value never reaches the boot error, whatever its type", () => {
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const cases: [SettingDecl, string, RegExp][] = [
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const SECRET_CASES: [SettingDecl, string, RegExp][] = [
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[{ key: "s", secret: true, type: "boolean" }, "hunter2-bool", /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S.*"true".*"false"/],
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[{ key: "s", secret: true, type: "enum", values: ["a", "b"] }, "hunter2-enum", /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S.*a, b/],
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[{ key: "s", secret: true, type: "number" }, "hunter2-number", /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S.*number/],
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[{ key: "s", secret: true, type: "url" }, "postgres user:hunter2-url@db", /PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S.*URL/],
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];
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for (const [decl, raw, names] of cases) {
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];
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for (const [decl, raw, names] of SECRET_CASES) {
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test(`a secret ${decl.type}'s bad value never reaches the boot error`, () => {
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const errors = resolveSettings([pluginWith("p", [decl])], { PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S: raw }).errors;
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assert.equal(errors.length, 1, decl.type);
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assert.match(errors[0] ?? "", names, decl.type);
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assert.ok(!(errors[0] ?? "").includes("hunter2"), decl.type);
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}
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});
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test("a non-secret's bad value is quoted in the boot error, so the operator sees the typo", () => {
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const errors = resolveSettings([pluginWith("p", [{ key: "s", type: "url" }])], { PLUGIN_SETTING_P_S: "not a url" }).errors;
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assert.match(errors[0] ?? "", /got "not a url"/);
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});
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assert.equal(errors.length, 1);
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assert.match(errors[0] ?? "", names);
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assert.ok(!(errors[0] ?? "").includes("hunter2"));
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});
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}
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test("a boolean is only \"true\"/\"false\" — a typo never degrades to false", () => {
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const plugins = [pluginWith("p", [{ default: true, key: "flag", type: "boolean" }])];
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@@ -6,12 +6,13 @@
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`Bar = 1`
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`Next ID = 55`
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`Next ID = 56`
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## Items
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| ID | Release | Blocked by | Exempt | Item | L | E | I | R | S | Moves | Score |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| 55 | 0.4.21 | | security | **Keep a URL config value out of the boot error that rejects it.** | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 0.0 |
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| 19 | 0.5.0 | | question | **Run the documented Docker commands on macOS and fix whatever misbehaves.** | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 by 3 | 3.3 |
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| 16 | 0.5.0 | | question | **Decide whether the single Keto `Resource` namespace splits into per-domain namespaces.** | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 7 by 2 | 0.5 |
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| 48 | 0.5.0 | | | **Correct the Keto tuple in the `login.ts` and `bootstrap.ts` comments to the `granted` relation the code writes.** | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | code health by 4 | 28.7 |
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@@ -33,6 +34,20 @@
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## Details
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### 55. Keep a URL config value out of the boot error that rejects it.
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`readOptionalUrl` and `readUrl` in `src/config.ts` throw `config: ${key} is not a valid URL: ${value}`,
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so a malformed value reaches the boot error and the log. A DSN whose password breaks parsing, such as
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`postgres://admin:pa/ss@db:5432/plugins`, leaks that password. The keys that can carry credentials:
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`PLUGIN_DB_URL` (`readCredentiallessUrl` refuses userinfo only after `readOptionalUrl` has parsed it,
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so a pasted admin DSN that fails to parse is echoed), and `OTLP_ENDPOINT`, whose collector URL may
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embed basic-auth userinfo. The other URL keys, `APP_URL`, `HYDRA_ADMIN_URL`, `JWKS_URL`,
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`KETO_READ_URL`, `KETO_WRITE_URL`, `KRATOS_ADMIN_URL` and `KRATOS_PUBLIC_URL`, pass through the same
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two readers, so the fix covers them too. Name the variable and what it accepts, never the value, and
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add a test per credential-bearing key. The other readers in `config.ts` echo only non-credential
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values. `PLUGIN_DB_ADMIN_URL` isn't read in `config.ts`: `bootstrap.ts` hands it straight to
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`postgres()`. Check whether the driver echoes a malformed one.
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### 19. Run the documented Docker commands on macOS and fix whatever misbehaves.
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Needs a Mac. Two suspects, both from `--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)"`: a macOS `id -g` is `20`, which is
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user