larvit/plainpages
3
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 1 Pull Requests 1 Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Document the auth security model in README #40

Open
lilleman wants to merge 6 commits from auth-security-model into main
pull from: auth-security-model
merge into: larvit:main
Conversation 0 Commits 6 Files Changed 3
+1
1 changed files with 1 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
Showing only changes of commit 98bdd2c1b5 - Show all commits
todo.md
+1
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
- [x] Build and publish docker image as CI/CD. (Duplicate of the CI/CD items above: `ci.yml` builds and pushes `gitea.larvit.se/larvit/plainpages:<commit hash>` behind the green gate, `release.yml` re-tags it to semver and syncs those tags to Docker Hub.)
- [x] The human developer understands the security model in the auth in this project. (README → Auth → [Security model](README.md#security-model): trust boundaries — browser untrusted, JWT untrusted until verified, the private network as the *only* guard on the unauthenticated Ory admin APIs, plugins trusted and unsandboxed, row rules upstream — plus a threat→defense table, the fail-closed rule, and pointers to the limits that are deliberately not guaranteed. Signed-not-encrypted is called out so nothing secret lands in a claim, and the JWT's ~10m TTL is separated from the 30-day Kratos session that re-mints it. Every row of the threat table is enforced by a test — the mandatory-`exp` guard was the one gap, now asserted in `src/auth/jwt-middleware.test.ts`; the trust-boundary bullets are not testable claims. Review also corrected the hardening checklist — `REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS` guards only `CSRF_SECRET`, so the committed Kratos/Hydra/Postgres dev secrets are now listed in "What you must supply".)
- [ ] Add i18n support.
- [ ] Decide (once) whether the CSRF token staying unbound to `sub`/session is accepted. `src/auth/csrf.ts` signs `<nonce>.<HMAC(secret, nonce)>` with no session binding, so any validly-signed token passes for any user — an attacker who can write cookies on the origin (a sibling subdomain, or a plaintext hop with `SECURE_COOKIES=false`) can fix a token they know. Standard for unbound signed double-submit and plausibly fine behind `SameSite=Lax` + HSTS. Accepted ⇒ record it in AGENTS.md → "Deliberate architectural deviations" and in README → Security model under "Not guaranteed"; not accepted ⇒ bind the nonce to `sub` (small change). Raised by review 2026-08-02; left undecided because it is a maintainer call, and an undocumented exception reads as a bug to the next reviewer.
## Architectural review findings (2026-07-02)