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// Config loaded once from the environment at boot. Fail-loud — a bad value, a missing enforced
// secret, a bad URL or an out-of-range port throws here, never at request time. Every value has a
// working dev default, so `docker compose up` runs with zero config.
// Log verbosity, most→least severe; "none" silences everything (matches @larvit/log's levels).
export const LOG_LEVELS = ["error", "warn", "info", "verbose", "debug", "silly", "none"] as const;
export type LogLevel = (typeof LOG_LEVELS)[number];
const DEV_PLUGIN_DB_SECRET = "dev-insecure-plugin-db-secret";
// The one resolution both processes use — they must agree exactly, or web connects with a password
// the role was never given. Compose passes an unset variable through as "", so empty means unset.
// `enforce` says whether storage is actually in play: web once PLUGIN_DB_URL is configured,
// bootstrap once a plugin declares storage. Enforced, the throwaway is refused — bootstrap is what
// writes these passwords into Postgres, so it must refuse *before* creating a role with one.
export function resolvePluginDbSecret(env: Env, enforce?: boolean): string {
return readSecret(env, "PLUGIN_DB_SECRET", DEV_PLUGIN_DB_SECRET, enforce ?? readBool(env, "REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS", false));
}
// Only bootstrap provisions, so only bootstrap reads this; env still gets read in one place.
export function resolvePluginDbConnectionLimit(env: Env): number {
return readPosInt(env, "PLUGIN_DB_CONNECTION_LIMIT", 10);
}
// PLUGIN_DB_URL is web's, and web must never hold credentials that outrank a plugin's own role.
// Pasting the admin DSN here would otherwise work — buildCredentials overwrites the userinfo — and
// leave a superuser password in the environment plugin code can read.
function readCredentiallessUrl(env: Env, key: string): string | undefined {
const value = readOptionalUrl(env, key);
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
const url = new URL(value);
if (url.username || url.password) {
throw new Error(`config: ${key} must carry no username or password — each plugin connects as its own role`);
}
return value;
}
export interface Config {
appUrl: string | undefined; // canonical public URL; set ⇒ off-host visitors are redirected here. Unset ⇒ no redirect (explicit toggle)
cacheTemplates: boolean;
csrfSecret: string;
hydraAdminUrl: string;
jwksUrl: string;
jwtAudience: string | undefined;
jwtClockSkewSec: number;
jwtIssuer: string | undefined;
ketoReadUrl: string;
ketoWriteUrl: string;
kratosAdminUrl: string;
kratosPublicUrl: string;
logFormat: "json" | "text"; // console/OTLP entry format (json for structured prod logs)
logLevel: LogLevel; // minimum severity emitted
oryTimeoutSec: number; // per-call timeout for outbound Kratos/Keto/Hydra fetches (bounds a hung Ory)
otlpEndpoint: string | undefined; // OTLP/HTTP collector base URI; unset ⇒ console-only (no export)
otlpProtocol: "http/json" | "http/protobuf"; // OTLP wire format (protobuf for json-averse collectors)
pluginDbSecret: string; // derives each plugin's database password (src/plugin-host/storage.ts)
pluginDbUrl: string | undefined; // credential-free Postgres base URL; unset ⇒ plugin storage is off
port: number;
revocationDenylist: boolean; // enable the optional instant permission/session revoke denylist
revocationTtlSec: number; // how long a revoke entry lives; keep ≥ tokenizer TTL + clock skew
secureCookies: boolean;
serviceName: string; // OTLP service.name — an implementer brands their own logs/traces
}
type Env = Record<string, string | undefined>;
// A secret: free to use a dev throwaway by default; when REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS is on it
// must be supplied and must not be the throwaway (README: real secrets replace dev ones).
function readSecret(env: Env, key: string, devDefault: string, requireSecure: boolean): string {
const value = env[key];
if (!requireSecure) return value || devDefault;
if (!value) throw new Error(`config: ${key} must be set when REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS=true`);
if (value === devDefault) throw new Error(`config: ${key} must not be the dev throwaway when REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS=true`);
return value;
}
// An explicit boolean toggle: only "true"/"false"; a typo fails at boot, never silently.
function readBool(env: Env, key: string, devDefault: boolean): boolean {
const value = env[key];
if (value === undefined) return devDefault;
if (value === "true") return true;
if (value === "false") return false;
throw new Error(`config: ${key} must be "true" or "false", got "${value}"`);
}
// An optional pinned value: present only when set non-empty. Unset ⇒ the matching claim
// check is skipped (clean clone — the dev tokenizer sets no iss/aud; verifier).
function readOptional(env: Env, key: string): string | undefined {
return env[key] || undefined;
}
// One of a fixed set; a typo fails at boot rather than degrading silently at runtime.
function readEnum<T extends string>(env: Env, key: string, allowed: readonly T[], devDefault: T): T {
const value = env[key];
if (value === undefined) return devDefault;
if ((allowed as readonly string[]).includes(value)) return value as T;
throw new Error(`config: ${key} must be one of ${allowed.join(", ")}, got "${value}"`);
}
// An optional absolute URL: unset/empty ⇒ undefined; a set-but-malformed value fails at boot.
function readOptionalUrl(env: Env, key: string): string | undefined {
const value = env[key] || undefined;
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
try {
new URL(value);
} catch {
throw new Error(`config: ${key} is not a valid URL: ${value}`);
}
return value;
}
// An absolute URL: defaults to the Ory service; validated so a typo fails at boot.
function readUrl(env: Env, key: string, devDefault: string): string {
const value = env[key] ?? devDefault;
try {
new URL(value);
} catch {
throw new Error(`config: ${key} is not a valid URL: ${value}`);
}
return value;
}
function readPort(env: Env): number {
const raw = env["PORT"];
if (raw === undefined) return 3000;
const port = Number(raw);
if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port < 1 || port > 65535) {
throw new Error(`config: PORT must be an integer 165535, got "${raw}"`);
}
return port;
}
// A non-negative integer count of seconds, with a default. Used for the JWT exp/nbf leeway.
function readNonNegInt(env: Env, key: string, devDefault: number): number {
const raw = env[key];
if (raw === undefined) return devDefault;
const n = Number(raw);
if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0) throw new Error(`config: ${key} must be a non-negative integer, got "${raw}"`);
return n;
}
function readPosInt(env: Env, key: string, devDefault: number): number {
const raw = env[key];
if (raw === undefined) return devDefault;
const n = Number(raw);
if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 1) throw new Error(`config: ${key} must be a positive integer, got "${raw}"`);
return n;
}
export function loadConfig(env: Env = process.env): Config {
const requireSecure = readBool(env, "REQUIRE_SECURE_SECRETS", false);
return {
// The canonical public URL — the single source for "where this deployment lives". When set, the
// canonical-host redirect (app.ts) sends a visitor who reached the app on any other host
// (localhost vs 127.0.0.1, a secondary domain) here, so the browser, the themed forms, and the
// cross-origin Kratos POST all share ONE cookie host. Explicit toggle (no magic default): unset ⇒
// no redirect (a prod operator can't accidentally bounce real users to a forgotten default). The
// dev stack sets it to localhost (compose.override.yml); Kratos' browser URLs derive from it too.
appUrl: readOptionalUrl(env, "APP_URL"),
cacheTemplates: readBool(env, "CACHE_TEMPLATES", false),
csrfSecret: readSecret(env, "CSRF_SECRET", "dev-insecure-csrf-secret", requireSecure),
// Hydra admin API — the OAuth2 login/consent challenge handshake; not on the first-party path.
hydraAdminUrl: readUrl(env, "HYDRA_ADMIN_URL", "http://hydra:4445"),
// verifier reads the same key the Kratos tokenizer signs with (kratos.yml jwks_url).
// Kratos doesn't republish it over HTTP, so default to a file:// of the tokenizer JWKS
// mounted into web (compose.yml). Prod overrides with a real key (README: rotation).
jwksUrl: readUrl(env, "JWKS_URL", "file:///etc/config/kratos/tokenizer/jwks.json"),
// Optional, off by default: pin the session-JWT issuer/audience for a hardened deploy.
jwtAudience: readOptional(env, "JWT_AUDIENCE"),
// exp/nbf leeway (s) for Kratos↔web clock drift; the auth E2E sets 0 to time tokens out fast.
jwtClockSkewSec: readNonNegInt(env, "JWT_CLOCK_SKEW_SEC", 60),
jwtIssuer: readOptional(env, "JWT_ISSUER"),
ketoReadUrl: readUrl(env, "KETO_READ_URL", "http://keto:4466"),
ketoWriteUrl: readUrl(env, "KETO_WRITE_URL", "http://keto:4467"),
kratosAdminUrl: readUrl(env, "KRATOS_ADMIN_URL", "http://kratos:4434"),
kratosPublicUrl: readUrl(env, "KRATOS_PUBLIC_URL", "http://kratos:4433"),
// observability. Console-only by default (clean clone). Setting OTLP_ENDPOINT to an
// OpenTelemetry Collector exports structured logs + per-request spans there (Loki/Tempo).
logFormat: readEnum(env, "LOG_FORMAT", ["json", "text"] as const, "text"),
logLevel: readEnum(env, "LOG_LEVEL", LOG_LEVELS, "info"),
oryTimeoutSec: readPosInt(env, "ORY_TIMEOUT_SEC", 5),
otlpEndpoint: readOptionalUrl(env, "OTLP_ENDPOINT"),
otlpProtocol: readEnum(env, "OTLP_PROTOCOL", ["http/json", "http/protobuf"] as const, "http/json"),
// Per-plugin storage. PLUGIN_DB_URL carries the server and its connection parameters but no
// credentials: the superuser DSN that provisions stays in bootstrap, so a plugin cannot read it
// out of web's environment. Unset ⇒ storage is off and a plugin declaring it fails loud at boot,
// which is also why the secret is only enforced once a URL is configured.
pluginDbSecret: resolvePluginDbSecret(env, requireSecure && Boolean(env["PLUGIN_DB_URL"])),
pluginDbUrl: readCredentiallessUrl(env, "PLUGIN_DB_URL"),
port: readPort(env),
// Optional instant-revoke, off by default. When on, an admin deactivate/delete or permission
// change revokes the subject's live tokens at once; the entry lives ttl seconds (≥ the 10m
// tokenizer TTL + skew, so it outlasts any pre-revoke token).
revocationDenylist: readBool(env, "REVOCATION_DENYLIST", false),
revocationTtlSec: readPosInt(env, "REVOCATION_TTL_SEC", 900),
// Set Secure on our session/CSRF cookies. Off by default (dev runs http); prod (https) sets it.
secureCookies: readBool(env, "SECURE_COOKIES", false),
serviceName: env["SERVICE_NAME"] || "plainpages", // OTLP service.name; empty ⇒ default
};
}