57 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
57 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
// Optional revocation denylist: instant role/session revoke without putting Keto
|
|
// back on the hot path. Off by default — enable with REVOCATION_DENYLIST=true.
|
|
//
|
|
// The hot path verifies a short-lived (~10m) session JWT in-process, so a revoked role or a
|
|
// killed session only takes effect when the token is next minted (re-login / TTL refresh) —
|
|
// up to one token TTL of lag. For security-critical revoke (offboarding, a compromised
|
|
// account) that lag is too long. An admin action records the subject as revoked-now and the
|
|
// hot path then rejects that subject's pre-revoke tokens at once, forcing a re-mint (which
|
|
// re-reads roles from Keto, or clears a now-dead session).
|
|
//
|
|
// Cost & scope: an in-memory, auto-evicting Map — no database, like the JWKS cache, so it
|
|
// stays inside the stateless model. A token carries `iat`, so a *fresh* re-login (iat after
|
|
// the revoke) passes while every token minted before the revoke is rejected. Entries self-evict
|
|
// after one token TTL, by which point any pre-revoke token has expired anyway. Single-process:
|
|
// instant on the instance that handled the revoke; across replicas/restarts the guarantee
|
|
// falls back to the token TTL (the gap is just no longer closed early). Back it with a shared
|
|
// store for hard multi-instance instant-revoke.
|
|
|
|
export interface Denylist {
|
|
// Hot-path check: is a token for `sub`, issued at `iat` (unix sec), revoked? A token minted
|
|
// after the latest revoke passes (a fresh re-login); a missing `iat` fails closed.
|
|
isRevoked(sub: string, iat: number | undefined): boolean;
|
|
// Record `sub` (a Kratos identity id) as revoked as of now: every token for it minted at or
|
|
// before this instant is rejected until it would have expired anyway.
|
|
revoke(sub: string): void;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface DenylistOptions {
|
|
now?: () => number; // unix seconds; injectable for tests
|
|
ttlSec?: number; // entry lifetime; keep ≥ tokenizer TTL + clock skew (default 900 ≥ 10m + 60s)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function createDenylist(options: DenylistOptions = {}): Denylist {
|
|
const ttl = options.ttlSec ?? 900;
|
|
const clock = options.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
|
|
const revokedAt = new Map<string, number>(); // sub → unix sec of its latest revoke
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
isRevoked(sub, iat) {
|
|
const at = revokedAt.get(sub);
|
|
if (at === undefined) return false;
|
|
if (clock() - at > ttl) {
|
|
revokedAt.delete(sub); // expired entry — any token it could match is long gone
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return iat === undefined || iat <= at; // pre-revoke token (or unknown iat) ⇒ revoked
|
|
},
|
|
revoke(sub) {
|
|
const now = clock();
|
|
// Full-scan prune (cheap, and only on a revoke — never the hot path) keeps the map bounded
|
|
// to recently-revoked subjects.
|
|
for (const [s, at] of revokedAt) if (now - at > ttl) revokedAt.delete(s);
|
|
revokedAt.set(sub, now); // latest revoke wins; advances the cutoff
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|