lilleman e22d24aa8a §10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs ...

Collapse the three nav builders into buildPluginChrome: chrome.bestHref does longest-prefix matching so deep admin routes mark their leaf. Delete adminNav; buildConfirmModel and the admin model builders take the resolved nav. The same role-filtered sidebar now renders signed in or out, collapsing to a burger on narrow screens.

shell.ejs gains menu (default true; menu:false -> single-column .app-bare), docTitle (separate <title> from the topbar, so the body keeps the single <h1>), and hideSignIn (suppress the footer Sign-in on auth pages to avoid a login loop). auth/home/landing now render inside the shell.

Dashboard is a replaceable instructional starter (definePlugin snippet, no mock data). Email stays delegated to Kratos: documented its built-in courier.template_override_path instead of adding web-side SMTP.

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

..

admin-clients.test.ts

Built-in OAuth2 client-registration admin screen (todo §6); /admin/clients lists/registers/deletes the Hydra OAuth2 clients other apps log in through us with. New src/admin-clients.ts (pure builders + handleAdminClients, mirroring the §5 Users/Roles screens): list (search/paginate over one fetched Hydra page), register (GET form + POST), read-only detail, delete-confirm. src/hydra-admin.ts gains the client half of the admin API — createClient/listClients/getClient/deleteClient over /admin/clients (+ a nextPageToken Link parser like kratos-admin) and the registration fields on OAuth2Client. Register builds a standard authorization-code client (+ refresh_token), confidential (client_secret_basic) or public (PKCE/none), with an optional first-party auto-consent flag; Hydra returns the client_secret once, so the register POST renders the new client's detail page with the one-time secret directly (no PRG) and it is never re-shown (getClient carries no secret; the detail test asserts it). Writes go only to Hydra; gated admin-only (anon->/login, non-admin->403) + every mutation CSRF-guarded via requireAdmin/guardedForm like §5; a Hydra 4xx (bad redirect/scope) re-renders the form (400), a 5xx -> 500 (mirrors oauth-login.ts); :id via safeDecode (malformed->404). Wired into app.ts (/admin/clients, gated on the hydra client present) and the shared adminSection (Users.Groups.Roles.OAuth2 clients, i-globe) so it shows for admins and is invisible otherwise. New views (admin/clients, client-form, client-detail + partials/client-{form,detail}-body) reuse the shell/filter-bar/data-table/field blocks; one .detail-list CSS rule; README Layout/§6 updated. Tests-first: hydra-admin.test.ts (client CRUD contracts incl. Link pagination/404->null/204), admin-clients.test.ts (builder/validation/payload matrix), app.test.ts HTTP integration (gate/list/register-shows-secret-once/invalid+CSRF-reject/detail-hides-secret/delete + malformed-%->404). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one nit (dropped a dead URL.protocol check in validateClientInput). Boot-verified the client CRUD live against real Hydra v26.2.0 (create->201 w/ one-time secret -> list finds it -> get -> delete -> get null); torn down. typecheck + 274 units green.

2026-06-19 11:23:27 +02:00

admin-clients.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

admin-groups.test.ts

Built-in Groups admin screen (todo §5); /admin/groups list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + membership (add/remove users & nested groups), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users (Kratos read only to label pickers). A group = Keto subject set Group:<name>#members, exists while it has ≥1 member: create writes the first-member tuple, delete removes all by partial-filter. Extracted shared admin-nav.ts (Dashboard·Users·Groups); new generic rowHeader <th scope=row> data-table cell. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: symmetric subject UUID-validation, duplicate-name rejection, malformed-%→404. 228→237 units + typecheck green; core Keto interactions boot-verified live

2026-06-18 17:40:36 +02:00

admin-groups.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

admin-nav.test.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

admin-nav.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

admin-roles.test.ts

Built-in Roles & permissions admin screen (todo §5); /admin/roles list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + assign-to-users/groups + "effective access" (Keto expand → transitive members), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users/Groups (Kratos read only to label members). A role = Keto subject set Role:<name>#members; reuses the Groups membership helpers (now-exported pagedTuples/memberCandidates/safeDecode); added a Roles nav entry (i-shield) + a .plain-list CSS rule. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its explicit-expand-depth nit. Live boot-verify caught a real bug the tests missed — Keto v26.2.0 nests the expand subject under tuple (not node top-level as the §4 ExpandTree type guessed), so expandToEffectiveUsers returned []; fixed type+walker+fixtures, re-verified a group-only member surfaces in effective access. 237→243 units + typecheck green; expand chain boot-verified live then torn down.

2026-06-18 18:18:18 +02:00

admin-roles.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

admin-users.test.ts

Built-in Users admin screen (todo §5); /admin/users list (filter/sort/paginate) + create/edit/deactivate/delete + trigger-recovery, writing only to Kratos via the admin client — gated admin-only (anon→/login, non-admin→403) and CSRF-guarded like logout. New kratosAdmin.createRecoveryCode; reserved the "admin" plugin id; views:[viewsDir] so subfolder views reuse partials/. Reviewer §5 opener: extracted shell-context.ts (buildShellContext/shellUser) shared by dashboard+admin, threading the real signed-in user (drops the hardcoded demo profile). 217→228 units + 8 visual E2E green; boot-verified full CRUD+recovery live on the Ory stack

2026-06-18 12:26:19 +02:00

admin-users.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

app.test.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

app.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

auth-card.test.ts

§8 full browser E2E (todo §8); the real Playwright UI against the live stack — the browser-UI flows the earlier full-stack suites deferred here. New e2e/full-flow.spec.ts + compose.e2e-full.yml covering password login, mocked SSO, menu filtering by role, users/groups/roles CRUD, a permission-gated plugin page, and logout (6/6 green on a clean stack, then torn down). Same-origin gateway (e2e/proxy.mjs, stdlib reverse proxy) fronts web + Kratos on one host so the browser's cookies round-trip (the themed form posts straight to Kratos); ory/kratos/e2e-proxy.yml points Kratos at it + --dev so cookies aren't Secure over http. SSO backed by a stdlib mock OIDC provider (e2e/mock-oidc.mjs, RS256 id_token, nonce-bound codes). Found + fixed a real bug the E2E surfaced: the SSO submit button shares the form with the required email/password fields, so HTML5 validation blocked it — added formnovalidate to the SSO buttons (auth-card.ejs), tests-first. Stability-reviewer APPROVE, no Critical/High (every dev/insecure knob is e2e-overlay-scoped, base/prod compose unaffected). typecheck + 305 units green. Also marks the §8 E2E-harness item (full stack up + seeded admin/Keto roles + tear-down).

2026-06-19 19:28:17 +02:00

body.test.ts

Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form

2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00

body.ts

Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form

2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00

bootstrap.test.ts

§7 review checkpoint (todo §7); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project and addressed findings, no Critical from either. Made permissions honest + decoupled the host from the plugin: new pure seedRoles + bootstrap discoverPlugins() seeds the demo admin admin(/ADMIN_ROLES) ∪ every discovered plugin's declared tokens, dropped the hardcoded scheduling:* from compose ADMIN_ROLES (clean-clone unchanged); docs now state a route/nav permission is a coarse role granted as Keto Role:<token>#members. Added src/plugin-api.ts — the stable author barrel the reference plugin now imports from instead of deep src/* (the contract boundary in code). Made per-plugin CSS usable: shell styles slot + plugins/scheduling/public/scheduling.css linked from the views. Reference now demonstrates hooks.onBoot validating SCHEDULING_UPSTREAM fail-loud (assertHttpUrl). Build ctx.chrome at most once per request (memoized). Doc honesty: fixed the false visual.spec coverage comment, softened the "every plugin ships a Playwright test" claim (authed flow = §8), added an Upstream contract block to the plugin README. Added LICENSE (MIT). Stability-reviewer APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed both Low nits. typecheck + 301 units green. Deferred: internal route-table (M1)→§9, safeUrl()→§9, data-table empty-state + success-flash→§8/polish, apiVersion-literal enforcement (prose), permission→requireRole rename (future minor).

2026-06-19 15:31:53 +02:00

bootstrap.ts

§9 trace all fetch + ENV service name + leveled logging (todo §9 follow-up); route every outbound fetch through the request logger, make the OTLP service name implementer-configurable, and add proper leveled logging throughout. An AsyncLocalStorage<Log> makes the per-request logger ambient (runWithLog/currentLog), so all outbound fetch traces with no signature churn: tracedFetch (a typeof fetch) routes through the active request log (client span + propagated W3C traceparent) for string/URL inputs, else plain fetch; server.ts wires it under the Ory timeout into every Kratos/Keto/Hydra + JWKS call (timeout still honoured — log.fetch spreads {...init,headers}). RequestContext gained ctx.log (request logger; additive/contract-stable, silent default) so a handler/plugin logs in-trace and ctx.log.fetch(url) traces upstream calls; the reference plugin's createUpstream defaults to tracedFetch and its handlers log via ctx.log; plugin-api.ts exports tracedFetch + the Log class. SERVICE_NAME (config + createLogger({serviceName})) brands the OTLP service.name. Leveled logging: who-did-what audit info lines on every admin write (user/group/role/client create·delete·assign — actor/target, no secrets), info on login (session mint) + logout, warn on missing-role 403 + CSRF rejections + Ory-unreachable, debug on a JWKS kid-miss reload. app.ts's handler body was extracted to handleRequest run inside runWithLog; end() now fires exactly once after BOTH the handler unwinds AND the response closes, so a client abort mid-handler can't end the log out from under a still-running ctx.log/tracedFetch (regression-tested) and the happy-path access line is never dropped. bootstrap.ts wraps main in runWithLog + traces the seed calls. Tests extended (logger: serviceName/runWithLog/currentLog/tracedFetch-continues-trace; config: SERVICE_NAME; context: ctx.log default+passthrough; app: ctx.log in-trace + ctx.log.fetch propagation + the abort race; plugin-api: tracedFetch+Log). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (fixed the abort-race end(); green nits addressed). docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.log/ctx.log.fetch/tracedFetch) + README (config, Observability tracing/serviceName, plugin note, Layout) updated. typecheck + 333 units + the full scripts/ci.sh E2E gate green (326 → 333).

2026-06-20 15:46:48 +02:00

chrome.test.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

chrome.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

compose.test.ts

Canonical host via APP_URL: stop login dumping users on /error from a host mismatch

2026-06-21 21:52:20 +02:00

config.test.ts

Canonical host via APP_URL: stop login dumping users on /error from a host mismatch

2026-06-21 21:52:20 +02:00

config.ts

Canonical host via APP_URL: stop login dumping users on /error from a host mismatch

2026-06-21 21:52:20 +02:00

context.test.ts

§9 trace all fetch + ENV service name + leveled logging (todo §9 follow-up); route every outbound fetch through the request logger, make the OTLP service name implementer-configurable, and add proper leveled logging throughout. An AsyncLocalStorage<Log> makes the per-request logger ambient (runWithLog/currentLog), so all outbound fetch traces with no signature churn: tracedFetch (a typeof fetch) routes through the active request log (client span + propagated W3C traceparent) for string/URL inputs, else plain fetch; server.ts wires it under the Ory timeout into every Kratos/Keto/Hydra + JWKS call (timeout still honoured — log.fetch spreads {...init,headers}). RequestContext gained ctx.log (request logger; additive/contract-stable, silent default) so a handler/plugin logs in-trace and ctx.log.fetch(url) traces upstream calls; the reference plugin's createUpstream defaults to tracedFetch and its handlers log via ctx.log; plugin-api.ts exports tracedFetch + the Log class. SERVICE_NAME (config + createLogger({serviceName})) brands the OTLP service.name. Leveled logging: who-did-what audit info lines on every admin write (user/group/role/client create·delete·assign — actor/target, no secrets), info on login (session mint) + logout, warn on missing-role 403 + CSRF rejections + Ory-unreachable, debug on a JWKS kid-miss reload. app.ts's handler body was extracted to handleRequest run inside runWithLog; end() now fires exactly once after BOTH the handler unwinds AND the response closes, so a client abort mid-handler can't end the log out from under a still-running ctx.log/tracedFetch (regression-tested) and the happy-path access line is never dropped. bootstrap.ts wraps main in runWithLog + traces the seed calls. Tests extended (logger: serviceName/runWithLog/currentLog/tracedFetch-continues-trace; config: SERVICE_NAME; context: ctx.log default+passthrough; app: ctx.log in-trace + ctx.log.fetch propagation + the abort race; plugin-api: tracedFetch+Log). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (fixed the abort-race end(); green nits addressed). docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.log/ctx.log.fetch/tracedFetch) + README (config, Observability tracing/serviceName, plugin note, Layout) updated. typecheck + 333 units + the full scripts/ci.sh E2E gate green (326 → 333).

2026-06-20 15:46:48 +02:00

context.ts

§10 review pass: address the architecture + product reviewers (todo §10); hide the gated Dashboard nav node from anonymous visitors in buildPluginChrome (a no-permission link to /dashboard only dead-ended them at /login) and dedup it into a shared DASHBOARD_NAV (admin-nav.ts, reused by chrome + adminNav). New chrome.signInHref bakes the current page in as return_to for the shell's anonymous Sign-in link (shell.ejs + reference overview.ejs), mirrored as optional ShellModel.signInHref so the typed builder is complete. ctx.chrome is now a lazy, memoized getter (context.ts chrome option = a factory) so a json/redirect handler or the public "/" with a standalone home never composes the global menu — app.ts passes the app-level memoized factory at every site. Default /dashboard prints a "Starter dashboard" note framing the mock-data home as a replaceable demo (signals its inert affordances); stale "until §4" comments fixed. RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS drift-guard test derives the built-in segments from AUTH_FLOWS + ADMIN_*_BASE + host literals (home stays deliberately unreserved). Refreshed the stale plugin-contract status blurb and documented the chrome.*→partials/shell mapping. Reviewers: architecture + product APPROVE (no addressable findings remain), stability APPROVE (no Critical/High/Medium). typecheck + 356 units + visual(10) + full-flow(7) E2E green.

2026-06-21 01:19:40 +02:00

cookie.test.ts

Consolidate related unit tests (todo §0): 59 → 42 cases, assertions preserved

2026-06-15 10:47:47 +02:00

cookie.ts

Tighten code comments + README (todo §0): denser, drop redundant prose; no behavior change

2026-06-15 10:30:06 +02:00

csrf.test.ts

Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form

2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00

csrf.ts

Secure cookie flags + CSRF for our own POST forms (todo §4); SECURE_COOKIES toggle on session/CSRF cookies; csrf.ts signed double-submit token + body.ts form reader; logout is now a CSRF-guarded POST form

2026-06-18 11:12:32 +02:00

dashboard.test.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

dashboard.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

data-table.test.ts

§8 review checkpoint (todo §8); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project and addressed findings. Critical (arch): "Testing & CI" shipped no CI automation — added scripts/ci.sh, the whole gate in one command (pin-lockstep check → typecheck → units (count guard) → the 4 E2E suites, each on its own named fresh stack with guaranteed down -v + non-zero exit on first failure). The gate immediately caught a latent bug: the auth-refresh suite booted Hydra (inherited §6 web→hydra dep) but the e2e overlays don't run Hydra with --dev, so it never went healthy — dropped Hydra from the auth suite's web deps (it never needed it). Product 🔴: the README Status note claimed auth/Hydra were unbuilt (false after §4/§6/§8) — corrected it + dropped the now-false _(planned)_ markers on the Auth/MVP sections. Product 🟡: added a login-only "Forgot password?" link (the recovery flow was unreachable from /login) and a data-table empty-state row (blank list tables, recurring deferral) — both tests-first. Docs: README Layout e2e line + e2e/package.json updated for the §8 suites. Stability-reviewer APPROVE-with-nits; addressed both (per-suite compose project names; grep || true) and fixed a project-name dot bug it introduced. Corrected a reviewer error (bootstrap uses restart on-failure:5, not unless-stopped). typecheck + 306 units green; scripts/ci.sh green end-to-end (visual 9 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 6), all stacks torn down. Deferred to §9: the app.ts internal route-table (raised urgency), visual-parity for admin/consent screens, a key-rotation E2E; L3 (plugin-api barrel in shifts.test) → the §8 test-cleanup item.

2026-06-19 20:08:48 +02:00

denylist.test.ts

§9 optional revocation denylist (todo §9); closes the documented ~10m role/session lag for security-critical revoke, off by default (REVOCATION_DENYLIST, zero hot-path cost + zero behaviour change when off). New pure src/denylist.ts (createDenylist({ttlSec})): an in-memory, auto-evicting Map<sub, revokedAt> — revoke(sub) records now, isRevoked(sub, iat) rejects a subject's tokens minted at/before the revoke (iat <= revokedAt; missing iat fails closed), so a fresh re-login (iat after the revoke) passes while a downgrade lands immediately. Entries self-evict after REVOCATION_TTL_SEC (default 900 ≥ the 10m tokenizer TTL + skew), so it stays a bounded cache like JWKS — no database, Keto stays off the hot path. Wired: jwt-middleware.ts takes the denylist in VerifyOptions and throws TokenError(expired) on a revoked sub, so resolveSession routes it through the existing §4 re-mint (live session → fresh post-revoke JWT with current Keto roles; dead/deactivated → cleared cookie). app.ts merges it into authOptions (the same resolveSession hot-path call) and hands a bound revoke to the Users + Roles admin deps; admin-users.ts revokes on deactivate/delete, admin-roles.ts revokes a direct user: member on assign/unassign (a group:/whole-role change is transitive → left to lag, documented). server.ts builds it only when the toggle is on. Tests-first: denylist.test.ts (iat semantics, cutoff-advance, TTL eviction), jwt-middleware.test.ts (revoked→expired→re-mint, fresh passes), config.test.ts (toggle + posint TTL), app.test.ts (hot-path reject + fresh-login pass; admin deactivate/role-assign/unassign record the revoke). Stability-reviewer on the diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low). Per the §9 security-headers precedent, covered by unit + app-HTTP integration (no new browser E2E — no new user-facing page). README (Auth trade-off + new "Instant revoke" subsection, config table, Layout) updated. typecheck + 317 units green.

2026-06-20 01:38:20 +02:00

denylist.ts

§9 optional revocation denylist (todo §9); closes the documented ~10m role/session lag for security-critical revoke, off by default (REVOCATION_DENYLIST, zero hot-path cost + zero behaviour change when off). New pure src/denylist.ts (createDenylist({ttlSec})): an in-memory, auto-evicting Map<sub, revokedAt> — revoke(sub) records now, isRevoked(sub, iat) rejects a subject's tokens minted at/before the revoke (iat <= revokedAt; missing iat fails closed), so a fresh re-login (iat after the revoke) passes while a downgrade lands immediately. Entries self-evict after REVOCATION_TTL_SEC (default 900 ≥ the 10m tokenizer TTL + skew), so it stays a bounded cache like JWKS — no database, Keto stays off the hot path. Wired: jwt-middleware.ts takes the denylist in VerifyOptions and throws TokenError(expired) on a revoked sub, so resolveSession routes it through the existing §4 re-mint (live session → fresh post-revoke JWT with current Keto roles; dead/deactivated → cleared cookie). app.ts merges it into authOptions (the same resolveSession hot-path call) and hands a bound revoke to the Users + Roles admin deps; admin-users.ts revokes on deactivate/delete, admin-roles.ts revokes a direct user: member on assign/unassign (a group:/whole-role change is transitive → left to lag, documented). server.ts builds it only when the toggle is on. Tests-first: denylist.test.ts (iat semantics, cutoff-advance, TTL eviction), jwt-middleware.test.ts (revoked→expired→re-mint, fresh passes), config.test.ts (toggle + posint TTL), app.test.ts (hot-path reject + fresh-login pass; admin deactivate/role-assign/unassign record the revoke). Stability-reviewer on the diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low). Per the §9 security-headers precedent, covered by unit + app-HTTP integration (no new browser E2E — no new user-facing page). README (Auth trade-off + new "Instant revoke" subsection, config table, Layout) updated. typecheck + 317 units green.

2026-06-20 01:38:20 +02:00

discovery.test.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

discovery.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

fetch-timeout.test.ts

§8 review convergence (todo §8); re-ran the architecture + product reviewers to convergence — 5 rounds, until both returned zero new actionable findings. Fixed across rounds 1-4 (tests-first): bounded every outbound Ory fetch with a timeout (src/fetch-timeout.ts withTimeout + ORY_TIMEOUT_SEC default 5, incl. the http JWKS fetch) so a hung Ory can't park a request handler; anonymous on a permission-gated plugin route now 303→/login (was a dead-end 403; signed-in-without-role still 403); an already-signed-in user is sent home from /login + /registration; the onRequest hook short-circuit now sets the fresh CSRF cookie; admin-users malformed :id → 404 (was 500) via safeDecode; parseJwks validates key element shape (fails loud at load); removed the dead COOKIE_SECRET (loaded + enforced + documented but never read); documented HYDRA_ADMIN_URL; admin recovery shows the code + links to the public /recovery instead of the browser-unreachable admin-API link; reference-plugin breadcrumb-label + pagination/datetime README notes; corrected the contract doc to not over-promise a post-login "retry". Declined: unconditional base-ctx chrome (would build the menu per request, regressing the lazy hot path). Deferred → §9: return_to-preservation for deep-link login. Stability-reviewer on the cumulative diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High (addressed its Low nits). typecheck + 310 units + the full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 9 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 6) green.

2026-06-20 00:42:23 +02:00

fetch-timeout.ts

§8 review convergence (todo §8); re-ran the architecture + product reviewers to convergence — 5 rounds, until both returned zero new actionable findings. Fixed across rounds 1-4 (tests-first): bounded every outbound Ory fetch with a timeout (src/fetch-timeout.ts withTimeout + ORY_TIMEOUT_SEC default 5, incl. the http JWKS fetch) so a hung Ory can't park a request handler; anonymous on a permission-gated plugin route now 303→/login (was a dead-end 403; signed-in-without-role still 403); an already-signed-in user is sent home from /login + /registration; the onRequest hook short-circuit now sets the fresh CSRF cookie; admin-users malformed :id → 404 (was 500) via safeDecode; parseJwks validates key element shape (fails loud at load); removed the dead COOKIE_SECRET (loaded + enforced + documented but never read); documented HYDRA_ADMIN_URL; admin recovery shows the code + links to the public /recovery instead of the browser-unreachable admin-API link; reference-plugin breadcrumb-label + pagination/datetime README notes; corrected the contract doc to not over-promise a post-login "retry". Declined: unconditional base-ctx chrome (would build the menu per request, regressing the lazy hot path). Deferred → §9: return_to-preservation for deep-link login. Stability-reviewer on the cumulative diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High (addressed its Low nits). typecheck + 310 units + the full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 9 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 6) green.

2026-06-20 00:42:23 +02:00

field.test.ts

Verification/recovery: guard the OTP code field against a pasted space (numeric inputmode + digits-only pattern + one-time-code autofill); Kratos doesn't trim, so a space-padded code was rejected as 'invalid or already used'

2026-06-21 23:26:23 +02:00

filter-bar.test.ts

Add data-driven filter-bar partial (todo §1); GET form: search/segmented/select/chips/daterange + applied pills

2026-06-15 12:04:25 +02:00

flow-view.test.ts

Verification/recovery: guard the OTP code field against a pasted space (numeric inputmode + digits-only pattern + one-time-code autofill); Kratos doesn't trim, so a space-padded code was rejected as 'invalid or already used'

2026-06-21 23:26:23 +02:00

flow-view.ts

Verification/recovery: guard the OTP code field against a pasted space (numeric inputmode + digits-only pattern + one-time-code autofill); Kratos doesn't trim, so a space-padded code was rejected as 'invalid or already used'

2026-06-21 23:26:23 +02:00

gen-jwks.test.ts

§9 JWT signing-key rotation runbook (todo §9); turned the README's 3-line rotation note into an operational runbook and closed the tooling gap that made its documented steps unrunnable — the old "prepend a key / drop it later" meant hand-editing a JSON file holding a private signing key. Tests-first: new pure rotateJwks(current,{prune}) in gen-jwks.ts — --prepend puts a fresh ES256 key first (Kratos signs with keys[0], the old keys still verify in-flight JWTs) and keeps the rest in order; --prune keeps only the newest (drop superseded post-TTL). CLI reads the existing set from a path arg and writes the new set to stdout (header documents the temp-file redirect so the shell's > can't truncate the input). gen-jwks.test.ts covers prepend (length+1, fresh kid first, old set preserved) + prune (→ 1 key). Runbook documents the two-sided install (Kratos signer env/mount + web JWKS_URL; file:// hot-reloads, base64:// immutable), why it's zero-downtime (sign-with-first + verify-by-kid), the scheduled path (prepend → restart kratos → verify new kid → wait ~12min = 10m TTL + skew → prune; rollback before prune) and the emergency path (replace with a single key → every leaked-key token fails signature → forced re-login; the §9 denylist is moot since the signature is already invalid). Verified the CLI live against the committed dev JWKS (bare→1, --prepend→2 with old kid second, --prune→1); jwks.json untouched. Docs/CLI-only, covered by units (per the §9 precedent, no new browser E2E). README Status + Layout updated. typecheck + 335 units green (333 → 335).

2026-06-20 15:54:17 +02:00

gen-jwks.ts

§9 JWT signing-key rotation runbook (todo §9); turned the README's 3-line rotation note into an operational runbook and closed the tooling gap that made its documented steps unrunnable — the old "prepend a key / drop it later" meant hand-editing a JSON file holding a private signing key. Tests-first: new pure rotateJwks(current,{prune}) in gen-jwks.ts — --prepend puts a fresh ES256 key first (Kratos signs with keys[0], the old keys still verify in-flight JWTs) and keeps the rest in order; --prune keeps only the newest (drop superseded post-TTL). CLI reads the existing set from a path arg and writes the new set to stdout (header documents the temp-file redirect so the shell's > can't truncate the input). gen-jwks.test.ts covers prepend (length+1, fresh kid first, old set preserved) + prune (→ 1 key). Runbook documents the two-sided install (Kratos signer env/mount + web JWKS_URL; file:// hot-reloads, base64:// immutable), why it's zero-downtime (sign-with-first + verify-by-kid), the scheduled path (prepend → restart kratos → verify new kid → wait ~12min = 10m TTL + skew → prune; rollback before prune) and the emergency path (replace with a single key → every leaked-key token fails signature → forced re-login; the §9 denylist is moot since the signature is already invalid). Verified the CLI live against the committed dev JWKS (bare→1, --prepend→2 with old kid second, --prune→1); jwks.json untouched. Docs/CLI-only, covered by units (per the §9 precedent, no new browser E2E). README Status + Layout updated. typecheck + 335 units green (333 → 335).

2026-06-20 15:54:17 +02:00

guards.test.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

guards.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

hooks.test.ts

Address whole-project review (todo §2); wire plugin hooks (onBoot/onRequest/onResponse), document template trust boundary, tidy discovery

2026-06-16 16:23:08 +02:00

hooks.ts

Address whole-project review (todo §2); wire plugin hooks (onBoot/onRequest/onResponse), document template trust boundary, tidy discovery

2026-06-16 16:23:08 +02:00

hydra-admin.test.ts

§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.

2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00

hydra-admin.ts

§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.

2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00

hydra.test.ts

Unify §3 test overlaps (todo §3); fold the 5× image-pin checks into one compose.test.ts scan + same-version sidecar test, drop the duplicate committed-JWKS re-validation in config.test.ts

2026-06-17 17:07:39 +02:00

icons.test.ts

Add lucide icon sprite partial (todo §1); src/icons.ts generates only-used symbols from pinned lucide-static

2026-06-15 11:44:40 +02:00

icons.ts

Add lucide icon sprite partial (todo §1); src/icons.ts generates only-used symbols from pinned lucide-static

2026-06-15 11:44:40 +02:00

jwks.test.ts

§8 review convergence (todo §8); re-ran the architecture + product reviewers to convergence — 5 rounds, until both returned zero new actionable findings. Fixed across rounds 1-4 (tests-first): bounded every outbound Ory fetch with a timeout (src/fetch-timeout.ts withTimeout + ORY_TIMEOUT_SEC default 5, incl. the http JWKS fetch) so a hung Ory can't park a request handler; anonymous on a permission-gated plugin route now 303→/login (was a dead-end 403; signed-in-without-role still 403); an already-signed-in user is sent home from /login + /registration; the onRequest hook short-circuit now sets the fresh CSRF cookie; admin-users malformed :id → 404 (was 500) via safeDecode; parseJwks validates key element shape (fails loud at load); removed the dead COOKIE_SECRET (loaded + enforced + documented but never read); documented HYDRA_ADMIN_URL; admin recovery shows the code + links to the public /recovery instead of the browser-unreachable admin-API link; reference-plugin breadcrumb-label + pagination/datetime README notes; corrected the contract doc to not over-promise a post-login "retry". Declined: unconditional base-ctx chrome (would build the menu per request, regressing the lazy hot path). Deferred → §9: return_to-preservation for deep-link login. Stability-reviewer on the cumulative diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High (addressed its Low nits). typecheck + 310 units + the full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 9 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 6) green.

2026-06-20 00:42:23 +02:00

jwks.ts

§9 trace all fetch + ENV service name + leveled logging (todo §9 follow-up); route every outbound fetch through the request logger, make the OTLP service name implementer-configurable, and add proper leveled logging throughout. An AsyncLocalStorage<Log> makes the per-request logger ambient (runWithLog/currentLog), so all outbound fetch traces with no signature churn: tracedFetch (a typeof fetch) routes through the active request log (client span + propagated W3C traceparent) for string/URL inputs, else plain fetch; server.ts wires it under the Ory timeout into every Kratos/Keto/Hydra + JWKS call (timeout still honoured — log.fetch spreads {...init,headers}). RequestContext gained ctx.log (request logger; additive/contract-stable, silent default) so a handler/plugin logs in-trace and ctx.log.fetch(url) traces upstream calls; the reference plugin's createUpstream defaults to tracedFetch and its handlers log via ctx.log; plugin-api.ts exports tracedFetch + the Log class. SERVICE_NAME (config + createLogger({serviceName})) brands the OTLP service.name. Leveled logging: who-did-what audit info lines on every admin write (user/group/role/client create·delete·assign — actor/target, no secrets), info on login (session mint) + logout, warn on missing-role 403 + CSRF rejections + Ory-unreachable, debug on a JWKS kid-miss reload. app.ts's handler body was extracted to handleRequest run inside runWithLog; end() now fires exactly once after BOTH the handler unwinds AND the response closes, so a client abort mid-handler can't end the log out from under a still-running ctx.log/tracedFetch (regression-tested) and the happy-path access line is never dropped. bootstrap.ts wraps main in runWithLog + traces the seed calls. Tests extended (logger: serviceName/runWithLog/currentLog/tracedFetch-continues-trace; config: SERVICE_NAME; context: ctx.log default+passthrough; app: ctx.log in-trace + ctx.log.fetch propagation + the abort race; plugin-api: tracedFetch+Log). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (fixed the abort-race end(); green nits addressed). docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.log/ctx.log.fetch/tracedFetch) + README (config, Observability tracing/serviceName, plugin note, Layout) updated. typecheck + 333 units + the full scripts/ci.sh E2E gate green (326 → 333).

2026-06-20 15:46:48 +02:00

jwt-middleware.test.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

jwt-middleware.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

jwt.test.ts

Consolidate related unit tests (todo §0): 59 → 42 cases, assertions preserved

2026-06-15 10:47:47 +02:00

jwt.ts

Tighten code comments + README (todo §0): denser, drop redundant prose; no behavior change

2026-06-15 10:30:06 +02:00

keto-client.test.ts

Built-in Roles & permissions admin screen (todo §5); /admin/roles list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + assign-to-users/groups + "effective access" (Keto expand → transitive members), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users/Groups (Kratos read only to label members). A role = Keto subject set Role:<name>#members; reuses the Groups membership helpers (now-exported pagedTuples/memberCandidates/safeDecode); added a Roles nav entry (i-shield) + a .plain-list CSS rule. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its explicit-expand-depth nit. Live boot-verify caught a real bug the tests missed — Keto v26.2.0 nests the expand subject under tuple (not node top-level as the §4 ExpandTree type guessed), so expandToEffectiveUsers returned []; fixed type+walker+fixtures, re-verified a group-only member surfaces in effective access. 237→243 units + typecheck green; expand chain boot-verified live then torn down.

2026-06-18 18:18:18 +02:00

keto-client.ts

Built-in Roles & permissions admin screen (todo §5); /admin/roles list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + assign-to-users/groups + "effective access" (Keto expand → transitive members), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users/Groups (Kratos read only to label members). A role = Keto subject set Role:<name>#members; reuses the Groups membership helpers (now-exported pagedTuples/memberCandidates/safeDecode); added a Roles nav entry (i-shield) + a .plain-list CSS rule. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its explicit-expand-depth nit. Live boot-verify caught a real bug the tests missed — Keto v26.2.0 nests the expand subject under tuple (not node top-level as the §4 ExpandTree type guessed), so expandToEffectiveUsers returned []; fixed type+walker+fixtures, re-verified a group-only member surfaces in effective access. 237→243 units + typecheck green; expand chain boot-verified live then torn down.

2026-06-18 18:18:18 +02:00

keto.test.ts

Unify §3 test overlaps (todo §3); fold the 5× image-pin checks into one compose.test.ts scan + same-version sidecar test, drop the duplicate committed-JWKS re-validation in config.test.ts

2026-06-17 17:07:39 +02:00

kratos-admin.test.ts

Built-in Users admin screen (todo §5); /admin/users list (filter/sort/paginate) + create/edit/deactivate/delete + trigger-recovery, writing only to Kratos via the admin client — gated admin-only (anon→/login, non-admin→403) and CSRF-guarded like logout. New kratosAdmin.createRecoveryCode; reserved the "admin" plugin id; views:[viewsDir] so subfolder views reuse partials/. Reviewer §5 opener: extracted shell-context.ts (buildShellContext/shellUser) shared by dashboard+admin, threading the real signed-in user (drops the hardcoded demo profile). 217→228 units + 8 visual E2E green; boot-verified full CRUD+recovery live on the Ory stack

2026-06-18 12:26:19 +02:00

kratos-admin.ts

Built-in Users admin screen (todo §5); /admin/users list (filter/sort/paginate) + create/edit/deactivate/delete + trigger-recovery, writing only to Kratos via the admin client — gated admin-only (anon→/login, non-admin→403) and CSRF-guarded like logout. New kratosAdmin.createRecoveryCode; reserved the "admin" plugin id; views:[viewsDir] so subfolder views reuse partials/. Reviewer §5 opener: extracted shell-context.ts (buildShellContext/shellUser) shared by dashboard+admin, threading the real signed-in user (drops the hardcoded demo profile). 217→228 units + 8 visual E2E green; boot-verified full CRUD+recovery live on the Ory stack

2026-06-18 12:26:19 +02:00

kratos-public.test.ts

Logout (todo §4); GET /logout clears plainpages_jwt + revokes the Kratos session (createLogoutFlow → redirect to Kratos logout URL → /login); wire shell Sign out link

2026-06-18 10:35:07 +02:00

kratos-public.ts

Comment/README cleanup (todo §4); tighten the kratos/keto client module-headers (drop forward-refs + caller-listings, keep rationale), retarget the stale safeUrl() ref in plugin-contract.md to §5/§7

2026-06-18 11:52:49 +02:00

kratos.test.ts

Canonical host via APP_URL: stop login dumping users on /error from a host mismatch

2026-06-21 21:52:20 +02:00

list-query.test.ts

Add parseListQuery helper (todo §1); read a list URL into { q, filters, sort, page, pageSize }, defaults+clamp, zero-throw

2026-06-15 13:38:34 +02:00

list-query.ts

Add parseListQuery helper (todo §1); read a list URL into { q, filters, sort, page, pageSize }, defaults+clamp, zero-throw

2026-06-15 13:38:34 +02:00

logger.test.ts

§9 trace all fetch + ENV service name + leveled logging (todo §9 follow-up); route every outbound fetch through the request logger, make the OTLP service name implementer-configurable, and add proper leveled logging throughout. An AsyncLocalStorage<Log> makes the per-request logger ambient (runWithLog/currentLog), so all outbound fetch traces with no signature churn: tracedFetch (a typeof fetch) routes through the active request log (client span + propagated W3C traceparent) for string/URL inputs, else plain fetch; server.ts wires it under the Ory timeout into every Kratos/Keto/Hydra + JWKS call (timeout still honoured — log.fetch spreads {...init,headers}). RequestContext gained ctx.log (request logger; additive/contract-stable, silent default) so a handler/plugin logs in-trace and ctx.log.fetch(url) traces upstream calls; the reference plugin's createUpstream defaults to tracedFetch and its handlers log via ctx.log; plugin-api.ts exports tracedFetch + the Log class. SERVICE_NAME (config + createLogger({serviceName})) brands the OTLP service.name. Leveled logging: who-did-what audit info lines on every admin write (user/group/role/client create·delete·assign — actor/target, no secrets), info on login (session mint) + logout, warn on missing-role 403 + CSRF rejections + Ory-unreachable, debug on a JWKS kid-miss reload. app.ts's handler body was extracted to handleRequest run inside runWithLog; end() now fires exactly once after BOTH the handler unwinds AND the response closes, so a client abort mid-handler can't end the log out from under a still-running ctx.log/tracedFetch (regression-tested) and the happy-path access line is never dropped. bootstrap.ts wraps main in runWithLog + traces the seed calls. Tests extended (logger: serviceName/runWithLog/currentLog/tracedFetch-continues-trace; config: SERVICE_NAME; context: ctx.log default+passthrough; app: ctx.log in-trace + ctx.log.fetch propagation + the abort race; plugin-api: tracedFetch+Log). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (fixed the abort-race end(); green nits addressed). docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.log/ctx.log.fetch/tracedFetch) + README (config, Observability tracing/serviceName, plugin note, Layout) updated. typecheck + 333 units + the full scripts/ci.sh E2E gate green (326 → 333).

2026-06-20 15:46:48 +02:00

logger.ts

§9 comment-density pass over the §9 accretion; two targeted dedupes (the rest authored dense, per the §6/§7/§8 precedent). (1) logger.ts: the requestStore declaration comment restated the file header (ambient per-request Log → deep modules join the trace without threading) and the accessor docs below it — collapsed to a one-line label. (2) security-headers.ts: dropped the redundant 'applied to every response' note above securityHeaders() (the file header + function name already say it). No stale forward-refs remain; README §9 sections left untouched (concise, _(planned)_ already swept in §8). Docs/comments-only; typecheck + 339 units green.

2026-06-20 16:45:58 +02:00

login.test.ts

Address whole-project architecture + product reviews (todo §5): make readRoles transitive so group→role grants reach the JWT (matches the Roles 'Effective access' view + OPL model; per-login only), per the user's call; add a zero-JS server-rendered confirm step for delete user/group/role (views/admin/confirm.ejs + shared buildConfirmModel; the Delete control is now a GET link, the delete stays a CSRF-guarded POST); self-lockout guards — no self-delete/deactivate (Users), no self-revoke of the direct admin grant + no delete of the admin role (Roles), each → 400 + inline error (direct-grant paths incl. the seeded admin; group-only-admin lockout = robust last-effective-admin check deferred §9); extract the gate+CSRF preamble copied across the 3 admin handlers into admin-nav.ts requireAdmin/guardedForm; shellUser keeps the email (name = local part, full email beneath). Reviewers: architecture no Critical/High, product 2 Critical + 1 High (all fixed). Deferred (scoped): host route-table→§6, list/template dedup→§5 cleanup, success-flash/empty-states/dangling-refs→§5 polish/§8, safeUrl→§7, 413/https/§N-drift→§9. Tests-first (extended the 3 admin HTTP tests + login/shell-context units); typecheck + 244 units + 8 visual + auth-refresh E2E green; stability-reviewer APPROVE

2026-06-18 19:18:50 +02:00

login.ts

§9 trace all fetch + ENV service name + leveled logging (todo §9 follow-up); route every outbound fetch through the request logger, make the OTLP service name implementer-configurable, and add proper leveled logging throughout. An AsyncLocalStorage<Log> makes the per-request logger ambient (runWithLog/currentLog), so all outbound fetch traces with no signature churn: tracedFetch (a typeof fetch) routes through the active request log (client span + propagated W3C traceparent) for string/URL inputs, else plain fetch; server.ts wires it under the Ory timeout into every Kratos/Keto/Hydra + JWKS call (timeout still honoured — log.fetch spreads {...init,headers}). RequestContext gained ctx.log (request logger; additive/contract-stable, silent default) so a handler/plugin logs in-trace and ctx.log.fetch(url) traces upstream calls; the reference plugin's createUpstream defaults to tracedFetch and its handlers log via ctx.log; plugin-api.ts exports tracedFetch + the Log class. SERVICE_NAME (config + createLogger({serviceName})) brands the OTLP service.name. Leveled logging: who-did-what audit info lines on every admin write (user/group/role/client create·delete·assign — actor/target, no secrets), info on login (session mint) + logout, warn on missing-role 403 + CSRF rejections + Ory-unreachable, debug on a JWKS kid-miss reload. app.ts's handler body was extracted to handleRequest run inside runWithLog; end() now fires exactly once after BOTH the handler unwinds AND the response closes, so a client abort mid-handler can't end the log out from under a still-running ctx.log/tracedFetch (regression-tested) and the happy-path access line is never dropped. bootstrap.ts wraps main in runWithLog + traces the seed calls. Tests extended (logger: serviceName/runWithLog/currentLog/tracedFetch-continues-trace; config: SERVICE_NAME; context: ctx.log default+passthrough; app: ctx.log in-trace + ctx.log.fetch propagation + the abort race; plugin-api: tracedFetch+Log). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (fixed the abort-race end(); green nits addressed). docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.log/ctx.log.fetch/tracedFetch) + README (config, Observability tracing/serviceName, plugin note, Layout) updated. typecheck + 333 units + the full scripts/ci.sh E2E gate green (326 → 333).

2026-06-20 15:46:48 +02:00

menu-config.test.ts

Add config/menu.ts central override + branding (todo §2); loadMenuConfig validates+merges, override applied to nav, branding into shell

2026-06-16 15:52:03 +02:00

menu-config.ts

Tighten code comments + README (todo §2); trim verbose §2 headers, drop stale planned/next-item markers, correct README status

2026-06-16 16:31:57 +02:00

menu.test.ts

Add menu/popover + theme-switch partials (todo §1); data-driven .menu (items/check-groups/positioning), Light/Auto/Dark switch, shell reuses both

2026-06-15 13:27:44 +02:00

nav-tree.test.ts

Add recursive nav-tree partial (todo §1); header/leaf × clickable/static, counts + aria-current

2026-06-15 11:59:26 +02:00

nav.test.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

nav.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

oauth-consent.test.ts

§6 test-cleanup (todo §6); unified the genuine OAuth2/Hydra test overlaps. The stale-4xx→400 / outage-5xx→500 degrade was triplicated across the app.test.ts /oauth2/login, /consent, /logout tests with near-identical app-spin-up boilerplate — production aims for byte-identical degrade across the three, so it's now one parametrized test iterating the three endpoints × {410→400, 503→500} (removes ~27 lines, makes the shared contract explicit/enforced); the three endpoint tests keep their happy-path + missing-challenge→400. oauth-consent.test.ts: merged the two consent-screen view tests (account named when signed in / omitted otherwise — same view surface) and the two acceptConsent grant tests (scope re-read + id_token on subject-match / omitted on mismatch — same method's grant body). Pure test refactor, no production code touched, every assertion preserved. The per-module matrices (hydra-admin/oauth-login/admin-clients, one contract per test) carry no fat. 279 → 278 units; typecheck + tests green.

2026-06-19 12:02:13 +02:00

oauth-consent.ts

§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.

2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00

oauth-login.test.ts

§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.

2026-06-19 11:47:06 +02:00

oauth-login.ts

Built-in OAuth2 login-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/login resolves a Hydra login challenge via the Kratos session — skip→accept(subject), live session→accept(identity id), no session→bounce to /login?return_to back here so Kratos lands on the challenge once signed in. New src/hydra-admin.ts (fetch client: get/accept/reject login request + HydraError, mirrors the kratos/keto clients) + src/oauth-login.ts (pure resolveLoginChallenge); wired in app.ts (the absolute return URL derives from the request Host + the SECURE_COOKIES scheme — a spoofed Host can't escape, Kratos validates return_to against its allow-list; /login now bakes return_to into the flow init), config.hydraAdminUrl (default http://hydra:4445), server builds the client, compose web now gates on hydra healthy (the app consumes it). A stale/invalid/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx — back button, slow login) degrades to a recoverable 400, not a 500; a genuine Hydra 5xx outage still surfaces as 500. Tests-first: hydra-admin/oauth-login units + app/config/compose HTTP integration + full-stack e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts (compose.e2e-oauth.yml — registers an OAuth2 client, starts an auth flow, asserts the unauthenticated bounce and the authenticated accept; boot-verified then torn down). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one warning (4xx→400 degrade). Deferred §9: document that prod allowed_return_urls entries must be exact origins with a trailing /. typecheck + 253 units + 8 visual + oauth-login E2E green. Consent handler + client registration are the next §6 items.

2026-06-18 21:45:24 +02:00

paginate.test.ts

Add paginate helper (todo §1); page model with row window + ellipsis sequence for pagination.ejs, clamped/guarded inputs

2026-06-15 13:50:15 +02:00

paginate.ts

Add paginate helper (todo §1); page model with row window + ellipsis sequence for pagination.ejs, clamped/guarded inputs

2026-06-15 13:50:15 +02:00

pagination.test.ts

Add data-driven pagination partial (todo §1); rows-per-page GET form + page-number links, zero-JS, query-param driven

2026-06-15 13:10:24 +02:00

plugin-api.test.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

plugin-api.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

plugin.test.ts

§10 review pass: address the architecture + product reviewers (todo §10); hide the gated Dashboard nav node from anonymous visitors in buildPluginChrome (a no-permission link to /dashboard only dead-ended them at /login) and dedup it into a shared DASHBOARD_NAV (admin-nav.ts, reused by chrome + adminNav). New chrome.signInHref bakes the current page in as return_to for the shell's anonymous Sign-in link (shell.ejs + reference overview.ejs), mirrored as optional ShellModel.signInHref so the typed builder is complete. ctx.chrome is now a lazy, memoized getter (context.ts chrome option = a factory) so a json/redirect handler or the public "/" with a standalone home never composes the global menu — app.ts passes the app-level memoized factory at every site. Default /dashboard prints a "Starter dashboard" note framing the mock-data home as a replaceable demo (signals its inert affordances); stale "until §4" comments fixed. RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS drift-guard test derives the built-in segments from AUTH_FLOWS + ADMIN_*_BASE + host literals (home stays deliberately unreserved). Refreshed the stale plugin-contract status blurb and documented the chrome.*→partials/shell mapping. Reviewers: architecture + product APPROVE (no addressable findings remain), stability APPROVE (no Critical/High/Medium). typecheck + 356 units + visual(10) + full-flow(7) E2E green.

2026-06-21 01:19:40 +02:00

plugin.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

postgres.test.ts

Unify §3 test overlaps (todo §3); fold the 5× image-pin checks into one compose.test.ts scan + same-version sidecar test, drop the duplicate committed-JWKS re-validation in config.test.ts

2026-06-17 17:07:39 +02:00

router.test.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

router.ts

§10 public pages + menu items, the blessed explicit alias (todo §10); a plugin may mark a page and its menu option public. A no-permission route/nav node is already anonymous-reachable, so per the human's pick this BLESSES that as a first-class, explicit choice (keep the default; add an explicit alias — not a secure-by-default flip). New optional public?: boolean on Route (src/plugin.ts) + NavNode (src/nav.ts) = "open to everyone, signed in or not", honored outright in isAuthorized (router.ts) + filterByRoles (nav.ts), and MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with permission — discovery shapeError recursively rejects a route/nav node setting both, failing the boot loud (never silently picks one). public is filter-only (toRenderNode never emits it). The shell (views/partials/shell.ejs) now renders a Sign in link instead of the profile/sign-out block for an anonymous visitor, so a public page in the native shell (ctx.chrome; ctx.user may be null) isn't a broken "Guest / Sign out". Reference plugin demos it: a public /scheduling Overview route + a public "Overview" nav child (the "Scheduling" header now shows for everyone), the shifts list still behind scheduling:read. Hardened the latent gap the shell newly leans on: claimsToUser rejects an empty email like it does an empty sub. Tests-first (348 → 354 units): router/nav/discovery (public open + reject-both + loads), shell (anon → Sign in, no logout form), app (public route anon-200), shifts (overview handler), jwt-middleware (empty email). Docs: plugin-contract.md ("Public pages & menu items" + route shape + shape-error note) + README (menu system + reference snippet). E2E: visual.spec asserts the public Overview is anon-200 + shown in the member's nav while the gated Shifts redirects/filters. stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium (addressed its one Low — the empty-email hardening). typecheck + 354 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate (visual 10 · auth 1 · oauth 2 · full 7) green.

2026-06-20 18:12:46 +02:00

safe-url.test.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

safe-url.ts

§9 whole-project arch+product review pass (todo §9); ran systems-architect + product-owner on the whole project (no Critical/High — a converged scaffold) and addressed the in-scope §9 customer-facing/security findings. (1) return_to deep-link login, open-redirect-safe: a gated request hit while signed out (plugin-route gate, requireSession, requireAdmin) bounces to /login?return_to=<host-relative path> via new loginRedirect(ctx) (GET/HEAD, skips /); /login bakes it into the Kratos flow — a host-relative target is wrapped through <origin>/auth/complete?return_to=<path> so the JWT mints before landing, an absolute target (§6 OAuth2 login challenge) passes to Kratos as-is; /auth/complete redirects to the requested page. (2) safeUrl()+localPath() in new pure src/safe-url.ts: safeUrl sanitises an untrusted href/src to relative-or-http(s) (else "#"), exported via plugin-api.ts (closes the contract's "planned for §9" pointer); localPath is the host-relative redirect-allowlist guard for return_to, re-checked at both /login and /auth/complete. (3) honest 503 on Ory-unreachable sign-in (views/503.ejs) instead of the misattributed catch-all 500; expired-flow 4xx still restarts. Tests-first throughout; stability-reviewer APPROVE (addressed its Medium — scoped the 503 catch so a template bug hits the 500 with a stack, not a 503). typecheck + 339 units + full scripts/ci.sh gate green. Deferred with justification: the app.ts route-table refactor (standalone change + §10 prereq), mock dashboard + public-page blessing (§10 lines 139/140), success-flash (known).

2026-06-20 16:39:09 +02:00

security-headers.test.ts

§9 response security headers (todo §9); the cookies/CSRF/clock-skew parts of this item all landed in §4 (HttpOnly/SameSite/Secure cookies in cookie.ts, the signed double-submit in csrf.ts, JWT_CLOCK_SKEW_SEC leeway on exp+nbf in jwt-middleware) — the open gap was response security headers, now closed. New pure src/security-headers.ts (securityHeaders({secure})): a strict CSP for the zero-JS core — script-src 'self' with NO 'unsafe-inline' (an injected <script> can't run; core ships none, a plugin may still serve its own /public/<id>/*.js), style-src adds 'unsafe-inline' for the partials' inline style=, img-src 'self' data:, frame-ancestors 'none', object-src 'none'; form-action deliberately omitted (the themed login POSTs to Kratos' often-cross-origin action URL) — plus X-Content-Type-Options nosniff, X-Frame-Options DENY, Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy same-origin, and HSTS only when secureCookies (https; ignored on dev http). Wired in app.ts: precomputed once at boot, res.setHeader'd at the very top of the handler before any branch, so every response (page/json/redirect/static/error/plugin) inherits them via writeHead's merge; a plugin overrides per-route via RouteResult.headers. Verified no view/CSS loads cross-origin (no <script> anywhere, no external fonts/CDNs), so default-src 'self' breaks nothing. Tests-first: security-headers.test.ts (strict defaults, script-src has no 'unsafe-inline', HSTS-only-on-secure) + an app.test.ts integration (the page and a static asset both carry the headers; HSTS toggles with SECURE_COOKIES). Stability-reviewer on the diff: APPROVE, no Critical/High (Low: a CDN/absolute branding logo would be CSP-blocked → documented the same-origin-logo constraint). README Status + Production + Layout updated. typecheck + 312 units green.

2026-06-20 01:18:24 +02:00

security-headers.ts

§9 comment-density pass over the §9 accretion; two targeted dedupes (the rest authored dense, per the §6/§7/§8 precedent). (1) logger.ts: the requestStore declaration comment restated the file header (ambient per-request Log → deep modules join the trace without threading) and the accessor docs below it — collapsed to a one-line label. (2) security-headers.ts: dropped the redundant 'applied to every response' note above securityHeaders() (the file header + function name already say it). No stale forward-refs remain; README §9 sections left untouched (concise, _(planned)_ already swept in §8). Docs/comments-only; typecheck + 339 units green.

2026-06-20 16:45:58 +02:00

server.ts

Canonical host via APP_URL: stop login dumping users on /error from a host mismatch

2026-06-21 21:52:20 +02:00

shell-context.test.ts

§10 review pass: address the architecture + product reviewers (todo §10); hide the gated Dashboard nav node from anonymous visitors in buildPluginChrome (a no-permission link to /dashboard only dead-ended them at /login) and dedup it into a shared DASHBOARD_NAV (admin-nav.ts, reused by chrome + adminNav). New chrome.signInHref bakes the current page in as return_to for the shell's anonymous Sign-in link (shell.ejs + reference overview.ejs), mirrored as optional ShellModel.signInHref so the typed builder is complete. ctx.chrome is now a lazy, memoized getter (context.ts chrome option = a factory) so a json/redirect handler or the public "/" with a standalone home never composes the global menu — app.ts passes the app-level memoized factory at every site. Default /dashboard prints a "Starter dashboard" note framing the mock-data home as a replaceable demo (signals its inert affordances); stale "until §4" comments fixed. RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS drift-guard test derives the built-in segments from AUTH_FLOWS + ADMIN_*_BASE + host literals (home stays deliberately unreserved). Refreshed the stale plugin-contract status blurb and documented the chrome.*→partials/shell mapping. Reviewers: architecture + product APPROVE (no addressable findings remain), stability APPROVE (no Critical/High/Medium). typecheck + 356 units + visual(10) + full-flow(7) E2E green.

2026-06-21 01:19:40 +02:00

shell-context.ts

§10 review pass: address the architecture + product reviewers (todo §10); hide the gated Dashboard nav node from anonymous visitors in buildPluginChrome (a no-permission link to /dashboard only dead-ended them at /login) and dedup it into a shared DASHBOARD_NAV (admin-nav.ts, reused by chrome + adminNav). New chrome.signInHref bakes the current page in as return_to for the shell's anonymous Sign-in link (shell.ejs + reference overview.ejs), mirrored as optional ShellModel.signInHref so the typed builder is complete. ctx.chrome is now a lazy, memoized getter (context.ts chrome option = a factory) so a json/redirect handler or the public "/" with a standalone home never composes the global menu — app.ts passes the app-level memoized factory at every site. Default /dashboard prints a "Starter dashboard" note framing the mock-data home as a replaceable demo (signals its inert affordances); stale "until §4" comments fixed. RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS drift-guard test derives the built-in segments from AUTH_FLOWS + ADMIN_*_BASE + host literals (home stays deliberately unreserved). Refreshed the stale plugin-contract status blurb and documented the chrome.*→partials/shell mapping. Reviewers: architecture + product APPROVE (no addressable findings remain), stability APPROVE (no Critical/High/Medium). typecheck + 356 units + visual(10) + full-flow(7) E2E green.

2026-06-21 01:19:40 +02:00

shell.test.ts

§10 - one menu everywhere (buildPluginChrome) + shell on every page; instructional starter dashboard; Kratos-native email docs

2026-06-23 21:26:00 +02:00

static.ts

§9 structured logging + OTLP observability (todo §9); structured, OTLP-native logging on @larvit/log (2.3.0, pinned; itself zero-dependency — the one new runtime dep). New pure src/logger.ts: createLogger() builds one app Log tagged service.name=plainpages (level/format/OTLP from config, injectable stdout/stderr); requestLogger() clones it per request (own root trace, inheriting level/format/streams/OTLP) into a "request" span, adopting an inbound W3C traceparent so a request continues an upstream proxy's distributed trace (malformed ⇒ fresh trace; clone honours a passed traceparent while dropping the parent's, unlike parentLog). app.ts builds the per-request log at the top of the handler and on res "close" (fires on completion AND abort, unlike "finish") emits one access line (method/path-without-query/status/ms/requestId, guarded) then end()s to flush the span (fire-and-forget .catch — a flaky collector never crashes a served request); the catch-all 500 + Ory-unreachable re-mint now log via reqLog.error/warn; static.ts mid-stream error takes an injected onError. server.ts builds the app logger, logs discovery/listen/shutdown, end()-flushes on SIGTERM/SIGINT (re-entry-guarded). bootstrap.ts events go structured (the human first-run banner stays raw). Config (environment-agnostic, fail-loud): LOG_LEVEL (info), LOG_FORMAT (text; prod compose → json), OTLP_ENDPOINT (unset ⇒ console-only; set ⇒ export logs + spans to an OTel Collector), OTLP_PROTOCOL (http/json|http/protobuf). compose: base sets LOG_FORMAT=json, dev override flips it to text. Tests-first: logger.test.ts (service.name/severity/level-gate/format, OTLP-only-when-endpoint, a stubbed-fetch proof it POSTs /v1/logs, requestLogger context-merge/own-root-trace/traceparent-continue/malformed-ignored), config.test.ts (4 toggles + validation), app.test.ts (live request emits the JSON access line), compose.test.ts (prod json / dev text). Stability-reviewer: APPROVE, no Critical/High (addressed both yellow nits — guarded access line + "finish"→"close" so aborted requests log; shutdown re-entry guard — and the green ones). README (config table, new Observability section, Status, Layout, runtime-deps) + AGENTS (deps) updated. typecheck + 326 units green (317 → 326).

2026-06-20 02:11:10 +02:00

theme-switch.test.ts

Add menu/popover + theme-switch partials (todo §1); data-driven .menu (items/check-groups/positioning), Light/Auto/Dark switch, shell reuses both

2026-06-15 13:27:44 +02:00

view-resolver.test.ts

Consolidate tests (todo §2); merge HTTP static tests, fold 403 render into the live gated route, unify resolveViewPath cases

2026-06-16 16:42:46 +02:00

view-resolver.ts

Add per-plugin view resolver (todo §2); render plugins/<id>/views/<view>.ejs with nested names + traversal guard, core partials reachable via include()

2026-06-16 13:41:02 +02:00