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29737d65a0
§7 test-cleanup (todo §7); pass over the §7 test accretion. Written tests-first across four small commits, so unlike §6 there was no boilerplate triplication — the per-module matrices are one-contract-per-test and the reference plugin's shifts.test deliberately unit-tests its pure builders, so those stay. One genuine merge: dashboard.test had two sibling tests asserting the same contract (buildDashboardModel role-filters a gated nav source via composeNav) on two sources — the §5 Admin section + the §7 plugin fragments. Combined into one "dashboard role-filters the gated Admin section and plugin fragments, each independently" that also strengthens coverage with cross-gating assertions (admin doesn't see the plugin section, a scheduling:read holder doesn't see Admin) neither original checked; all prior assertions preserved, 3 model builds vs 4. Left separate (distinct functions/levels): the chrome-unit vs dashboard-unit vs app-HTTP plugin-nav tests, and the two app.test plugin integration tests (RouteResult shapes vs chrome+CSRF). Pure test refactor, no production code. 301 → 300 units; typecheck + tests green.
98784a3239
§7 comment cleanup (todo §7); targeted density pass over the §7 accretion. The §7 modules were authored dense (the reference plugin is a teaching artifact, the host additions concise), so two wins: tightened chrome.ts's module header (7→5 lines, dropped the input-list duplicated by ChromeOptions + the nav-composition restatement already carried by the nav field/markCurrent comments); fixed a stale forward-ref in docs/plugin-contract.md (the safeUrl() helper said "§5/§7" but §7 deferred it to §9). Left intact: the reference plugin's instructive comments, the EJS view config-doc headers, and the contract doc + plugin README (authored concise in §7). README Status/_(planned)_/Layout refresh stays §9. Docs/comments-only; typecheck + 301 units green.
4e97fb619e
§7 review checkpoint (todo §7); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project and addressed findings, no Critical from either. Made permissions honest + decoupled the host from the plugin: new pure seedRoles + bootstrap discoverPlugins() seeds the demo admin admin(/ADMIN_ROLES) ∪ every discovered plugin's declared tokens, dropped the hardcoded scheduling:* from compose ADMIN_ROLES (clean-clone unchanged); docs now state a route/nav permission is a coarse role granted as Keto Role:<token>#members. Added src/plugin-api.ts — the stable author barrel the reference plugin now imports from instead of deep src/* (the contract boundary in code). Made per-plugin CSS usable: shell styles slot + plugins/scheduling/public/scheduling.css linked from the views. Reference now demonstrates hooks.onBoot validating SCHEDULING_UPSTREAM fail-loud (assertHttpUrl). Build ctx.chrome at most once per request (memoized). Doc honesty: fixed the false visual.spec coverage comment, softened the "every plugin ships a Playwright test" claim (authed flow = §8), added an Upstream contract block to the plugin README. Added LICENSE (MIT). Stability-reviewer APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed both Low nits. typecheck + 301 units green. Deferred: internal route-table (M1)→§9, safeUrl()→§9, data-table empty-state + success-flash→§8/polish, apiVersion-literal enforcement (prose), permission→requireRole rename (future minor).
45d9b2ede9
§7 verify plugin contract end-to-end vs README (todo §7); cross-checked every contract claim in README/docs/plugin-contract.md/plugins/scheduling against the implementation + shipped reference plugin — the contract holds (derived id/mount, apiVersion+checkApiVersion, gated nav/routes, all RouteResult shapes, ctx.chrome native shell, ctx.verifyCsrf, can()/GuardError, view-resolver including core + own partials, registered icons, upstream-fetch statelessness). Fixed one doc drift: docs/plugin-contract.md reserved-id list named 8 ids but RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS has 10 — the §5 admin + §6 oauth2 mounts were missing (discovery refuses them, test-covered), so the doc now lists all 10. Docs-only; typecheck + 296 units green.
f189f88942
§7 reference plugin (todo §7); plugins/scheduling is the worked example of the plugin contract — a list page fetching upstream data, a CSRF-guarded form forwarding writes upstream, permission-gated nav. shifts.ts: an injectable-fetch upstream REST client (stateless stand-in for the customer backend) + thin handler factories (list filters by ?q + degrades to a recoverable page on upstream-down; create CSRF-guards via ctx.verifyCsrf, validates, forwards, PRG, 502 on upstream 4xx). plugin.ts: apiVersion literal, namespaced scheduling:read/write perms, nav gated so the whole Scheduling header vanishes for non-holders. Views compose the core building blocks around the native app shell, incl. the plugin's own partials/shift-form. New host capability so a plugin page is native + secure (src/chrome.ts buildPluginChrome): ctx.chrome = brand/global-nav/user/theme/csrf for partials/shell (global menu = Dashboard + every plugin nav fragment + gated admin section, role-filtered + current-marked); ctx.verifyCsrf = the host's bound double-submit verifier (secret stays in the host). Both added to RequestContext (defaulted in buildContext), built per plugin route in app.ts (CSRF cookie set when fresh). Dashboard merges plugin nav fragments too (gated => invisible to anonymous, visual E2E byte-identical). Out of the box: bootstrap grants the demo admin scheduling:read/write (seedAdmin generalized to a roles list, env ADMIN_ROLES); dev compose runs a tiny stdlib mock upstream (examples/shifts-upstream, SCHEDULING_UPSTREAM). plugins/ added to tsconfig + the npm test glob. Tests-first across shifts/chrome/app/dashboard/bootstrap. README Building-a-plugin + Layout and docs/plugin-contract.md (ctx.chrome/verifyCsrf, upstream pattern) updated. typecheck + 296 units + the Ory-free visual E2E green (plugin discovered at boot, routes/nav gated, dashboard unchanged); live full-stack boot-verified (stack up with plugin + mock upstream serving the seeded shifts, bootstrap grants in real Keto all allowed:true) then torn down. apiVersion stays 1.0.0 (contract still assembled in §7). Authenticated browser happy-path deferred to §8 full E2E (line 114).
ec7dcafecd
§6 test-cleanup (todo §6); unified the genuine OAuth2/Hydra test overlaps. The stale-4xx→400 / outage-5xx→500 degrade was triplicated across the app.test.ts /oauth2/login, /consent, /logout tests with near-identical app-spin-up boilerplate — production aims for byte-identical degrade across the three, so it's now one parametrized test iterating the three endpoints × {410→400, 503→500} (removes ~27 lines, makes the shared contract explicit/enforced); the three endpoint tests keep their happy-path + missing-challenge→400. oauth-consent.test.ts: merged the two consent-screen view tests (account named when signed in / omitted otherwise — same view surface) and the two acceptConsent grant tests (scope re-read + id_token on subject-match / omitted on mismatch — same method's grant body). Pure test refactor, no production code touched, every assertion preserved. The per-module matrices (hydra-admin/oauth-login/admin-clients, one contract per test) carry no fat. 279 → 278 units; typecheck + tests green.
d011bf2589
§6 comment cleanup (todo §6); tightened the OAuth2 handler comments in app.ts — the three sibling /oauth2/{login,consent,logout} blocks had drifted toward repeating the same prose. Trimmed the login block header (dropped derivable "looked up over Hydra's admin API" + condensed the provider-role line to "Provider-only.", matching the consent/logout blocks) and collapsed the consent 4xx→400/5xx→500 degrade comment to the one-liner the logout sibling already uses, so the canonical explanation lives once (the login block). §6 modules (hydra-admin/oauth-login/oauth-consent/admin-clients) were authored dense — no changes. Left intact: the logout GET-accept safety rationale (reviewer-requested), the EJS view config-doc headers, and the §6 README sections (authored concise in §6). README Status/_(planned)_/Layout refresh stays §9. typecheck + 279 units green.
521c09fa2d
§6 review checkpoint (todo §6); ran the architecture + product reviewers on the whole project (weighted to the Hydra OAuth2 surfaces) and addressed their findings — no Critical from either. Fixed tests-first: (HIGH, arch) /oauth2/logout was published to Hydra (hydra.yml urls.logout) and asserted in hydra.test.ts but had no handler — a dead/published contract; added hydra-admin.acceptLogoutRequest (PUT logout/accept via the shared reqUrl(kind…)) + a GET /oauth2/logout branch that accepts the RP-initiated logout_challenge → 303 to Hydra's post-logout redirect (missing→400, stale 4xx→recoverable 400, 5xx→500, byte-identical degrade to the login/consent siblings; GET-accept is safe since the challenge is Hydra-minted+single-use; the first-party POST /logout still owns ending the Kratos session + JWT cookie). (HIGH, arch) added oauth2 to RESERVED_PLUGIN_IDS so a plugins/oauth2/ folder can't silently shadow the provider routes (the route surface the §4 reserved-id fix missed; discovery now refuses it loud). (Product Blocker) the third-party consent screen now names the signed-in account — "Signed in as <email>" (ConsentView.account from whoami) — plus a CSRF-guarded "Not you? Sign out" form, so consent is informed on shared devices. (MEDIUM, arch) consent accept() now projects id_token claims only when the live Kratos session subject === the challenge subject Hydra bound at login, never leaking a mismatched session's email/name into the issued token (guards the auto-accept path too). (Product nits) register-form confidential-vs-public guidance + a client-detail "delete and re-register / secret shown once" note (no-edit friction + lost-secret). New tests across discovery (reserved oauth2), hydra-admin (acceptLogoutRequest contract), oauth-consent (subject-match + account-in-view), app.test (logout 303/400/500 matrix, consent identity+sign-out, client form/detail copy); e2e/oauth-login.spec asserts the consent screen names the account. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High — addressed its doc/comment follow-ups (README §6 documents the logout handler + consent identity line; a comment notes the GET-accept is Hydra-validated). Deferred (reviewer-scoped): the host internal route-table (arch M1, now a pure dedup once H1/H2 are point-fixed) → §9; the RP-initiated-logout browser/live E2E → §8; redirect-URI scheme allowlist + safeUrl() → §7; full client edit / empty-list state / success-flash → §8/polish. typecheck + 279 units green; full-stack OAuth2 login+consent E2E verified live against real Hydra v26.2.0 then torn down.
1c324b18e3
Built-in OAuth2 client-registration admin screen (todo §6); /admin/clients lists/registers/deletes the Hydra OAuth2 clients other apps log in through us with. New src/admin-clients.ts (pure builders + handleAdminClients, mirroring the §5 Users/Roles screens): list (search/paginate over one fetched Hydra page), register (GET form + POST), read-only detail, delete-confirm. src/hydra-admin.ts gains the client half of the admin API — createClient/listClients/getClient/deleteClient over /admin/clients (+ a nextPageToken Link parser like kratos-admin) and the registration fields on OAuth2Client. Register builds a standard authorization-code client (+ refresh_token), confidential (client_secret_basic) or public (PKCE/none), with an optional first-party auto-consent flag; Hydra returns the client_secret once, so the register POST renders the new client's detail page with the one-time secret directly (no PRG) and it is never re-shown (getClient carries no secret; the detail test asserts it). Writes go only to Hydra; gated admin-only (anon->/login, non-admin->403) + every mutation CSRF-guarded via requireAdmin/guardedForm like §5; a Hydra 4xx (bad redirect/scope) re-renders the form (400), a 5xx -> 500 (mirrors oauth-login.ts); :id via safeDecode (malformed->404). Wired into app.ts (/admin/clients, gated on the hydra client present) and the shared adminSection (Users.Groups.Roles.OAuth2 clients, i-globe) so it shows for admins and is invisible otherwise. New views (admin/clients, client-form, client-detail + partials/client-{form,detail}-body) reuse the shell/filter-bar/data-table/field blocks; one .detail-list CSS rule; README Layout/§6 updated. Tests-first: hydra-admin.test.ts (client CRUD contracts incl. Link pagination/404->null/204), admin-clients.test.ts (builder/validation/payload matrix), app.test.ts HTTP integration (gate/list/register-shows-secret-once/invalid+CSRF-reject/detail-hides-secret/delete + malformed-%->404). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one nit (dropped a dead URL.protocol check in validateClientInput). Boot-verified the client CRUD live against real Hydra v26.2.0 (create->201 w/ one-time secret -> list finds it -> get -> delete -> get null); torn down. typecheck + 274 units green.
0900bf49bd
Built-in OAuth2 consent-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/consent grants scopes to a client logging in through us. New src/oauth-consent.ts (pure, sibling of oauth-login.ts): resolveConsentChallenge auto-accepts a first-party client (Hydra metadata.first_party===true) or a Hydra-skipped one, else returns a view to show the themed consent screen; acceptConsent re-reads the challenge so scopes/audience are never client-supplied; rejectConsent → access_denied. The grant carries an OIDC session.id_token with email/name projected from the Kratos identity (whoami traits, omitted when absent). src/hydra-admin.ts gains the consent half (get/accept/reject consent + types; login/consent URL builder folded into one reqUrl(kind,…) + shared put()). Wired in app.ts at GET|POST /oauth2/consent (gated on hydra+kratos): GET shows/auto-accepts (sets the CSRF cookie when fresh), POST is CSRF-guarded (same signed double-submit as /logout) and dispatches allow→accept / else→reject → 303 to Hydra; a stale/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx) degrades to a recoverable 400, a real outage (5xx) → 500 (mirrors /oauth2/login). views/oauth-consent.ejs + partials/consent-body.ejs reuse the auth-card, listing the requested scopes (friendly labels for the standard OIDC ones) with Allow/Deny submit buttons. Tests-first: hydra-admin consent contracts + oauth-consent skip/first-party/third-party/audience/id_token/refetch/reject matrix + app HTTP integration (auto-accept / screen+CSRF cookie / allow+deny / forged-CSRF→403 / missing→400 / stale→400 / outage→500). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High. Extended e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts to drive the whole authorization-code flow against real Hydra — login accept → follow login_verifier through Hydra → web's consent screen (third-party e2e-login, scopes listed) → Allow → consent_verifier → client callback with a real code (per-host cookie jars, Hydra resume URLs rebased onto the compose host). typecheck + 262 units + 8 visual + OAuth login+consent E2E green. OAuth2 client registration is the next §6 item.
3c8090e8e3
Built-in OAuth2 login-challenge handler (todo §6); /oauth2/login resolves a Hydra login challenge via the Kratos session — skip→accept(subject), live session→accept(identity id), no session→bounce to /login?return_to back here so Kratos lands on the challenge once signed in. New src/hydra-admin.ts (fetch client: get/accept/reject login request + HydraError, mirrors the kratos/keto clients) + src/oauth-login.ts (pure resolveLoginChallenge); wired in app.ts (the absolute return URL derives from the request Host + the SECURE_COOKIES scheme — a spoofed Host can't escape, Kratos validates return_to against its allow-list; /login now bakes return_to into the flow init), config.hydraAdminUrl (default http://hydra:4445), server builds the client, compose web now gates on hydra healthy (the app consumes it). A stale/invalid/consumed challenge (Hydra 4xx — back button, slow login) degrades to a recoverable 400, not a 500; a genuine Hydra 5xx outage still surfaces as 500. Tests-first: hydra-admin/oauth-login units + app/config/compose HTTP integration + full-stack e2e/oauth-login.spec.ts (compose.e2e-oauth.yml — registers an OAuth2 client, starts an auth flow, asserts the unauthenticated bounce and the authenticated accept; boot-verified then torn down). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its one warning (4xx→400 degrade). Deferred §9: document that prod allowed_return_urls entries must be exact origins with a trailing /. typecheck + 253 units + 8 visual + oauth-login E2E green. Consent handler + client registration are the next §6 items.
bfc9f80b61
Unify the §5 admin-test duplication (todo §5 test cleanup); the three admin-screen HTTP tests (Users/Groups/Roles) in app.test.ts repeated an identical ~13-line harness preamble (createApp+listen+url+CSRF token+admin cookie+get/post), an identical gate block, and a stateful in-memory KetoClient defined 3× (trivial stubKeto + two byte-identical inline fakes). Extracted adminHarness(t,opts)→{url,token,get,post}, assertAdminGate(url,get,path), and one fakeKeto(tuples?,over?) that subsumes stubKeto (login tests now fakeKeto([],…)) and both admin fakes (fakeKeto(tuples) / fakeKeto(tuples,{expand})); hoisted shared sameSet/matchesTuple up beside it. Per-module unit files keep their matrix pattern (no force-merge across modules; build*ListModel stays per-file). −30 net lines, zero coverage lost; typecheck + 244 units green.
0a5eafd2f8
Tighten §5 admin comments + README (todo §5 cleanup); compress the three near-identical admin module headers (drop restatement the README/code already carry), shorten the README Layout views/ run-on + add the missing delete-confirm view. Also bank a pre-existing AGENTS.md tweak: skip the stability-reviewer for purely doc/comment changes. Docs/comments-only — typecheck + 244 units green.
c78e95889c
Address whole-project architecture + product reviews (todo §5): make readRoles transitive so group→role grants reach the JWT (matches the Roles 'Effective access' view + OPL model; per-login only), per the user's call; add a zero-JS server-rendered confirm step for delete user/group/role (views/admin/confirm.ejs + shared buildConfirmModel; the Delete control is now a GET link, the delete stays a CSRF-guarded POST); self-lockout guards — no self-delete/deactivate (Users), no self-revoke of the direct admin grant + no delete of the admin role (Roles), each → 400 + inline error (direct-grant paths incl. the seeded admin; group-only-admin lockout = robust last-effective-admin check deferred §9); extract the gate+CSRF preamble copied across the 3 admin handlers into admin-nav.ts requireAdmin/guardedForm; shellUser keeps the email (name = local part, full email beneath). Reviewers: architecture no Critical/High, product 2 Critical + 1 High (all fixed). Deferred (scoped): host route-table→§6, list/template dedup→§5 cleanup, success-flash/empty-states/dangling-refs→§5 polish/§8, safeUrl→§7, 413/https/§N-drift→§9. Tests-first (extended the 3 admin HTTP tests + login/shell-context units); typecheck + 244 units + 8 visual + auth-refresh E2E green; stability-reviewer APPROVE
6920751cb8
Wire built-in admin screens into the global menu (todo §5); extract adminSection() = one permission-gated 'Admin' header (Users/Groups/Roles), reused by both the home dashboard menu and the in-screen adminNav so they can't drift. composeNav drops the whole gated header+subtree for a non-admin/anonymous (cosmetic — the admin routes stay independently GuardError(403)-gated); narrowed AdminScreen to groups|roles|users. Reuses existing sprite icons (no icon-guard change); default anonymous / render byte-equivalent so visual E2E unaffected. Tests-first: dashboard model gating (admin→3 hrefs, non-admin→absent) + app HTTP (admin JWT→/admin/users link, anon→absent). Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High/Medium. README Layout updated. 242→244 units + typecheck green
a016a0131e
Built-in Roles & permissions admin screen (todo §5); /admin/roles list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + assign-to-users/groups + "effective access" (Keto expand → transitive members), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users/Groups (Kratos read only to label members). A role = Keto subject set Role:<name>#members; reuses the Groups membership helpers (now-exported pagedTuples/memberCandidates/safeDecode); added a Roles nav entry (i-shield) + a .plain-list CSS rule. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: APPROVE, no Critical/High; addressed its explicit-expand-depth nit. Live boot-verify caught a real bug the tests missed — Keto v26.2.0 nests the expand subject under tuple (not node top-level as the §4 ExpandTree type guessed), so expandToEffectiveUsers returned []; fixed type+walker+fixtures, re-verified a group-only member surfaces in effective access. 237→243 units + typecheck green; expand chain boot-verified live then torn down.
32e5e2f7eb
Built-in Groups admin screen (todo §5); /admin/groups list (search/sort/paginate) + create/delete + membership (add/remove users & nested groups), writing only to Keto — gated admin-only + CSRF-guarded like Users (Kratos read only to label pickers). A group = Keto subject set Group:<name>#members, exists while it has ≥1 member: create writes the first-member tuple, delete removes all by partial-filter. Extracted shared admin-nav.ts (Dashboard·Users·Groups); new generic rowHeader <th scope=row> data-table cell. Stability-reviewer run as a local PR: symmetric subject UUID-validation, duplicate-name rejection, malformed-%→404. 228→237 units + typecheck green; core Keto interactions boot-verified live
79cfa2ee7f
Built-in Users admin screen (todo §5); /admin/users list (filter/sort/paginate) + create/edit/deactivate/delete + trigger-recovery, writing only to Kratos via the admin client — gated admin-only (anon→/login, non-admin→403) and CSRF-guarded like logout. New kratosAdmin.createRecoveryCode; reserved the "admin" plugin id; views:[viewsDir] so subfolder views reuse partials/. Reviewer §5 opener: extracted shell-context.ts (buildShellContext/shellUser) shared by dashboard+admin, threading the real signed-in user (drops the hardcoded demo profile). 217→228 units + 8 visual E2E green; boot-verified full CRUD+recovery live on the Ory stack
cb050bd4c1
Combine/unify §4 auth tests (todo §4); fold authenticate's matrix into resolveSession (it's the .user wrapper) and the two /auth/complete HTTP tests into one — 219→217, zero coverage lost
d1fbf8fa1f
Comment/README cleanup (todo §4); tighten the kratos/keto client module-headers (drop forward-refs + caller-listings, keep rationale), retarget the stale safeUrl() ref in plugin-contract.md to §5/§7