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63 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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## 0.6.0 (unreleased)
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- `client()` now bounds each connect attempt at 10 seconds, the TLS handshake included, and reports
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one that expires as an ordinary connect failure, so `reconnect` retries it on its usual backoff.
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A connect previously waited the operating system out, around 130 s on Linux against a host that
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drops SYNs. `connectTimeout` retunes the bound, and `connectTimeout: false` restores the old wait.
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- Addresses, ids and every other text field on the wire are read and written as latin1. A
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`source_addr` of `Kaffeé` previously reached the application as `Kaffei`, because the codec wrote
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the octet and then masked bit 7 reading it back; `destination_addr`, `system_id`, `message_id`,
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`password`, `service_type` and the C-Octet String TLVs were affected the same way. A character past
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`U+00FF` in one of those fields is now refused, where it used to go out as its low octet.
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**A server comparing `systemId` or `password` could be impersonated.** Masking bit 7 folded 127 of
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the 255 non-zero octets onto a character a low octet also reaches, so the bind credentials your
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`authenticate` received were not unique to the octets the peer sent: one refused as `admin` could
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bind as `\xE1dmin` and match the same string. latin1 is one-to-one over the octets, so two
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different wire values no longer arrive as one. Read 0.5.0 bind logs for a `systemId` you did not
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issue.
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**Check what you stored before you roll this out.** Values your application persisted under 0.5.0
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were read with bit 7 masked, so an address or a `message_id` carrying an octet above `0x7F` is
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spelled differently now: a stored id will not match the receipt it belongs to, and a stored address
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will not match the sender it came from. Ids most SMSCs issue are digits or hex and are unaffected.
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- A `U+0000` inside a C-Octet String — `source_addr`, `message_id`, `system_id` and the rest — is
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refused. An Octet String carries a NULL as before.
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- A non-finite number — `NaN`, `Infinity`, `-Infinity` — is refused where a text field on the wire
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takes one. `sendSms({ from: NaN })` put the literal sender `NaN` on the wire and resolved as a
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successful send; `message_id`, `source_addr` and the string TLVs took such a number the same way.
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The call now resolves with `err` naming the field — `from: Expected a finite number, got NaN` — so
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a caller that reads only `smsIds` meets a failure it has not met before. A whole number in an
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address or an id still spells its digits, so `message_id: 123` is unchanged. The integer fields
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name a refused `NaN` too, where the refusal used to read `null`.
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- An `alert_notification` or an `outbind` from the peer is logged and left unanswered, as SMPP 3.4
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gives neither a response. Each one used to emit `sessionError`, `"alert_notification" has no
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response command`.
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- `maxOctets` charges each held segment 1000 octets beyond its own, 300 more per TLV on it, and 300
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per occurrence of a repeatable one. Segments of empty fields or thousands of empty TLVs used to
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count as next to nothing, so a peer could hold far more than the cap. **Raise a `maxOctets` you
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tuned low**: it now holds several times fewer segments, and an incomplete message evicted over
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the cap is lost, since its segments were already answered.
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- Unanswered `sms` messages are capped at 64 MiB per session by the `maxOctets` charge, beside the
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1000-message cap: the oldest is dropped with a warning, as over the count. A peer faster than an
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application answering asynchronously could hold gigabytes per session.
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- `server()` refuses a `maxOctets` below 1 or not a whole number, `Infinity` included, like its
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other limits. `server({ maxOctets: 0 })` used to start and then refuse every multipart message.
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- `callback_num`, `callback_num_atag`, `callback_num_pres_ind`, `broadcast_area_identifier` and
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`broadcast_error_status`, the TLVs SMPP allows more than once in a PDU, keep every occurrence in
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wire order. A PDU carrying two of one used to keep only the last.
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**Reading one of these now needs an index.** `pduObj.tlvs.callback_num?.tagValue` is a `Buffer[]`
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even where one arrived (a `number[]` for `callback_num_pres_ind` and `broadcast_error_status`), so a
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`Buffer.isBuffer()` or `typeof` check written for 0.5.0 now reads it as absent. Read `tagValue[0]`
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for the first occurrence. `objToPdu()`, `session.send()` and `session.sendReturn()` take
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`{ tagValue: [value] }` for them and refuse a lone value before anything goes out.
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- `cmds.broadcast_sm_resp.tlvMap` is removed; nothing read it.
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## 0.5.0
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The TypeScript rewrite. What a 0.4.0 consumer has to change is in
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[MIGRATION.md](https://gitea.larvit.se/larvit/smpp-js/src/branch/main/MIGRATION.md).
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