Answer the first round: credential paths in the test, the plugin's install and headless request, true changelog lines
This commit is contained in:
+2
-2
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Unreleased
|
||||
|
||||
- larv-review's full security scan runs: `settings.json` enables the `claude-security` plugin.
|
||||
- systems-architect, product-owner-reviewer and stability-reviewer can no longer edit what they review, and larv-review hands a reviewer without a shell the branch diff and the list of tracked files.
|
||||
- Install the `claude-security` plugin (README → Install): larv-review's full security scan now runs on a chunk that touches secrets, auth or an external surface. `settings.json` silences the plugin's scan tip after `git push`.
|
||||
- systems-architect and product-owner-reviewer can no longer edit what they review; stability-reviewer keeps its shell to run tests, and loses Claude Code's file-editing tools.
|
||||
- Every project's `todo.md` takes one shape, and larv-review's gate checks it: one table of items, each scored by the formula and goal weights the file states and held to its bar, an item under the bar dropped unless its Exempt cell says why. `bin/rank_todo.py` ranks the table, and `rank_todo.py --help` shows a valid file.
|
||||
- Run `loop-claude` only in a sandbox with no direct access to production: every claude it starts skips every permission prompt.
|
||||
- First release: `README.md` states what the checkout holds and needs, `loop-claude --help` what `loop-claude` does.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Me, on my own machines, which take tagged releases. Nobody else depends on it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Install
|
||||
|
||||
Check out the latest tag in `~/.claude`, with Python 3.11 or newer as `python3` on `PATH`. Link `loop-claude` onto `PATH`: `ln -s ~/.claude/bin/loop-claude ~/.local/bin/loop-claude`. Run `loop-claude` only in a sandbox with no direct access to a production environment, such as a dedicated VM: every claude it starts, the interrupt included, skips every permission prompt.
|
||||
Check out the latest tag in `~/.claude`, with Python 3.11 or newer as `python3` on `PATH`. Install the full-scan plugin larv-review runs: `claude plugin install claude-security@claude-plugins-official`. Link `loop-claude` onto `PATH`: `ln -s ~/.claude/bin/loop-claude ~/.local/bin/loop-claude`. Run `loop-claude` only in a sandbox with no direct access to a production environment, such as a dedicated VM: every claude it starts, the interrupt included, skips every permission prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
## Release
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,12 +4,17 @@ import unittest
|
||||
from test_python_floor import ROOT
|
||||
|
||||
PRIVATE = [
|
||||
".claude/settings.local.json",
|
||||
".credentials.json",
|
||||
"auto-mode-transcripts/a.jsonl",
|
||||
"backups/.claude.json.backup.1",
|
||||
"daemon-auth-status.json",
|
||||
"daemon.log",
|
||||
"daemon/control.key",
|
||||
"debug/a.txt",
|
||||
"file-history/a/b.md",
|
||||
"history.jsonl",
|
||||
"jobs/a/b.json",
|
||||
"loop-claude-transcripts/a/b.jsonl",
|
||||
"memory/MEMORY.md",
|
||||
"paste-cache/a.txt",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
|
||||
"rust-analyzer-lsp@claude-plugins-official": true,
|
||||
"code-review@claude-plugins-official": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"env": {
|
||||
"CLAUDE_SECURITY_SCAN_TIP": "off"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"effortLevel": "xhigh",
|
||||
"modelSettings": {
|
||||
"claude-fable-5-1": {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ Follow `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` → "Git, commits, and PRs". Never commit to the de
|
||||
|------|----------|----------------------------------------|
|
||||
| Architecture, then the principles audit and the comprehension floor | systems-architect, then principles-auditor and the `comprehension-panel` scoring run | carries an architectural decision: a new, restructured or moved component, module, service or boundary; a new dependency or first use of an infrastructure pattern (queue, cron, cache, websocket, …); a new or changed external contract (routes, request/response shapes, events, webhooks, published file formats, CLI flags and exit codes); a schema change beyond an additive column; the chunk shipping its release's last item |
|
||||
| Security | `/security-review` | changes code or config; a fix, only where it opens an untrusted-input boundary or touches authn/authz, secrets or crypto |
|
||||
| Full security scan | the `claude-security` plugin (`/claude-security` → "Scan changes") | touches authn/authz, secrets or crypto, opens an untrusted-input boundary, or adds an external surface |
|
||||
| Full security scan | the `claude-security` plugin: `/claude-security scan this branch's changes at high, accepting the time and token cost` | touches authn/authz, secrets or crypto, opens an untrusted-input boundary, or adds an external surface |
|
||||
| Stability | stability-reviewer | changes code, config or tests; a fix, only where it changes behaviour: what the code or its tests do |
|
||||
| Product-owner | product-owner-reviewer | changes an external surface: API, CLI, UI, error or deprecation text a consumer reads, README and docs an outside reader lands on |
|
||||
| Prose | prose-reviewer | every chunk; a fix, where it touches prose |
|
||||
|
||||
Give a reviewer without Bash the branch diff and `git ls-files`'s output in its prompt: some harnesses grant it Read alone.
|
||||
|
||||
A comment is prose, not code. Passes run in this order: line-level polish on code the architect wants restructured, or on a call the security pass will rewrite, is wasted work.
|
||||
|
||||
Give a reviewer without Bash the branch diff and `git ls-files`'s output in its prompt: some harnesses grant it Read alone.
|
||||
|
||||
**Record, then ask** — for the architecture pass and the full scan:
|
||||
|
||||
1. A record is a decision-log entry, or a planning item crediting the pass, that the repo held before the chunk began. Where one holds the decision this change executes, skip the pass and cite the record.
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Then the comprehension floor: the `comprehension-panel` skill's scoring run (`~/
|
||||
|
||||
A verified HIGH inside this chunk's blast radius is fixed here, outside it on its own branch and PR with this chunk waiting behind it. Say which.
|
||||
|
||||
The full-scan plugin unavailable → say so in the summary; never substitute a hand-rolled pass.
|
||||
`claude-security` unavailable, or a scan that ran nothing → say so in the summary; never substitute a hand-rolled pass.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not over-read a clean result.** `/security-review` is single-repo and static: it does not trace authorization across services, does not run the application, and deliberately excludes dependency CVEs in third-party libraries — Renovate/Dependabot owns those, per `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` → "Working with the codebase". Never point an automated reviewer or scan at an untrusted fork's PR content; a PR body is untrusted input to it (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
It lives under `~/.claude`, which `.gitignore` keeps from the remote, so a lost disk loses every unattended run's record. Back it up only to a destination private to me and encrypted at rest: the worker runs with permissions bypassed, so the archived tool results can hold credentials it read.
|
||||
|
||||
Question for the human: which destination meets that bar?
|
||||
Question for the human: which destination is private to you and encrypted at rest?
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Wait out a usage limit and retry however long it lasts, without counting it as a failed run.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user